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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY, a partnership,
Case No. 20080858-CA

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC,
a limited liability company; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS (HAYNES PARTIES)

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT1
The Order and Final Judgment was entered September 16, 2008.2 The Notice of
Appeal was timely filed on October 14,2008 ;3 an Amended Notice of Appeal (eliminating
Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users Corporation as an appellant) was filed October 16,
2008.4

'The trial court record consists of papers from two cases that were ultimately
consolidated, but the papers in each case were indexed separately for appeal. Papers from
Haynes Land & Livestock Co. v. Jacob Family Chalk Creek, trial court case no. 980600244,
will be cited as "R-Haynes." Papers from Triple HRanch, LC v. Boyer, trial court case no.
000600299, will be cited as "R-TripleH."
2

R-Haynes 1693-1700.

3

R-Haynes 1701-1705.

4

R-Haynes 1711-1715.
1

The Order and Final Judgment contained a certification of finality under Rule 54(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.5 A claim for partition by Triple H Ranch, LC against
Fern Boyer, Gerald Boyer, Gregory Boyer, J.S. Hansen, and Alfred C. Blonquist remains
pending before the trial court.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Where a court determines that a road has been dedicated to the public by use

for ten years, may the court then delegate to a county the determination of the road's width?
Standard of review: The trial court determined that Utah Code § 72-5-108 directs that
the width of highways, including highways dedicated by user, be determined by the highway
authority of that particular jurisdiction. The appeal of this decision presents a question of
statutory construction that is reviewed for correctness.6
Preservation below: The Haynes parties requested that the trial court determine width
in Plaintiffs' Trial Brief.7 This issue was also raised in Haynes' Motion for Reconsideration
of Road Width.8
2.

Where a party has sued to quiet title, asserting that defendant had no rights of

travel over plaintiffs property other than rights already of record, and the defendant did not

5

R-Haynes 1697.

*Reese v. Tingey Constr., 2008 UT 7, f 6, 177 P.3d 605, 607.
7

R-Haynes 1271-1273. The trial court's statement that the width issue "was not
mentioned in pre-trial briefs," R-Haynes 1470, is incorrect.
8

R-Haynes 1500-1503.
2

dispute plaintiffs legal title but claimed and proved only a particular public road across
plaintiffs property, was plaintiff entitled to a decree that defendant had no other rights of
travel across plaintiffs property?
Standard of review: This issue does not challenge the trial court's findings but
disputes the conclusions of law. "While findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are
clearly erroneous, conclusions of law are simply reviewed for correctness without any special
deference."9
Preservation below: The Haynes parties raised this issue below in Haynes' Objection
to Jacob-Christensen's Proposed Form of Order.10
3.

Where an owner abandons a road to the public by permitting limited use, may

the court fix the width of the road based on contemplated future uses that are significantly
more burdensome than the uses permitted by the landowner?
Standard of review: This presents issues of constitutional and statutory construction
that are reviewed for correctness.
Preservation below: This was raised in the pretrial11 and post-trial12 memoranda filed
by Haynes.

9

Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376,
1377-1378 (Utah 1987).
10

R-Haynes 1526, 1633-34.

n

R-Haynes 1271-1273.

12

R-Haynes 1374-1376.
3

4.

Should occasional travel over wild, uncultivated, and unenclosed land be

considered permissive?
Standard of review: "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal interpretation of
the Dedication Statute for correctness and its factual findings for clear error."13 Where the
court exercises its discretion based on a misunderstanding of the law, however, that
constitutes an abuse of discretion.14
Preservation below: This was argued in the post-trial memorandum of Haynes.15
5.

Where a survey map showed a road existed, did comments in j oumals and other

historic documents showing sporadic activities in a particular area, without mentioning travel
over the roads or specifying a path of travel, constitute clear and convincing evidence of
continuous public, non-permissive use of the entire length of the road?
Standard of review: "But whether the facts of a case satisfy the requirements of the
Dedication Statute is a mixed question of fact and law that involves various and complex
facts, evidentiary resolutions, and credibility determinations. Thus, an appellate court
reviews a trial court's decision regarding whether a public highway has been established
under the Dedication Statute for correctness but grants the court significant discretion in its

u

Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, f 8, 179 P.3d 768.

l4

Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

15

R-Haynes 1367-1368.
4

application of the facts to the statute."16 Where the court exercises its discretion based on a
misunderstanding of the law, however, that constitutes an abuse of discretion.17
Preservation below: A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence need not be
"preserved" by raising it before the trial court.18 Haynes did, however, argue that the
evidence of public use was not clear and convincing.19
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
Utah Code § 72-5-104(1) (2006): "A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use
of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often
years."
Utah Code § 72-5-108: "The width of rights-of-way for public highways shall be set
as the highway authorities of the state, counties, or municipalities may determine for the
highways under their respective jurisdiction."

16

Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, f 8, 179 P.3d 768.

ll

Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

n

ProMaxDev. Corp, v. Mattson, 943 P.2d247,256 (Ct. App. 1997), cert denied, 953
P.2d 449 (Utah 1997).
19

R-Haynes 1364-1366.
5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is a civil case seeking a declaration that certain roads were private. Other parties

asserted that the roads became public under Utah Code § 72-5-104(1) (2006) or that other
easements existed.
B.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Haynes Latnd & Livestock Company ("Haynes") sued its adjoining landowners, Jacob

Family Chalk Creek, Limited,20 Catherine B. Christensen, L.L.C., and Brian Garff (jointly
referred to in this brief as "Jacobs"), seeking a determination that Jacobs had no rights of
travel over the Haynes property beyond existing recorded easements.21 Haynes also sought
to enjoin Garff from constructing a sizeable building on the Jacobs property.22 Summit
County was initially named as a defendant23 but was later dismissed.24

Jacobs

counterclaimed to establish that the roads over the Haynes property were public or subject
to easements in favor of Jacobs.25

20

Jacob Feimily Chalk Creek, LLC, later acquired the title and was substituted as a
party. R-Haynes 1162-1164.
21

R-Haynes 1-9.

22

R-Haynes 5-6.

23

R-Haynes 6-7.

24

R-Haynes 54-55.

25

R-Haynes 65-79.
6

Triple H Ranch, LC, a limited liability company with the same principals as Haynes
Land & Livestock Company, also commenced a suit for partition by sale against certain
members of the Boyer families and others that owned interests in property surrounding Boyer
Lake.26 Among other allegations, the partition complaint asserted that the defendants had no
lawful access to the properties. The Boyer defendants27 counterclaimed, seeking among
other claims a determination that a road leading to the lake was a public county road.28 The
defendants other than the Boyer defendants either disclaimed any interest in the property29
or were dismissed from the action.30

The Boyer defendants later filed an amended

counterclaim and third-party complaint naming additional parties and asserting among other
claims that the roads were public or that the Boyer defendants had prescriptive easements.31
The two lawsuits were consolidated for purposes of both discovery and trial.32 After
consolidation of the cases, Jacobs filed an amended answer and counterclaim against all

26

R-TripleH 1-6.

27

Fern J. Boyer, Gerald G. Boyer, Gregory J. Boyer, J.S. Hansen, and Alfred C.
Blonquist. R-TripleH 19-29.
28

R-TripleH 25-26.

29

R-TripleH 38-39 (disclaimer by Barbara Hall and Kevin Hall); R-TripleH 51
(disclaimer by Karel Snyder).
30

R-TripleH 40-41 (dismissing Helen W. Blonquist and Helen W. Blonquist, Trustee.)

3l

R-TripleH 81-94.

32

R-Haynes 107-110.
7

parties in both actions.33 A certificate of default was entered against Stillman Seven, Barbara
Hall, Kevin Hall, Helen W. Blonquist, and Karel J. Snyder.34 B.A. Bingham and Sons, LLC,
answered the counterclaim35 but elected to not appear at trial.36 David B. Williams likewise
answered37 but elected to not appear at trial.38
Summit County was named as a defendant in the initial complaint filed by Haynes,
but was later dismissed.39 Summit County was subsequently brought back into the lawsuit
as a defendant to the counterclaim filed by Jacobs.40
Prior to trial, the parties stipulated and the trial court ordered that trial of the partition
claims be bifurcated from the road and easement claims.41

33

R-Haynes 189-209.

34

R-Haynes 518-521.

35

R-Haynes 222-227.

36

Transcript vol. I, 8; R-Haynes 1316-1318.

37

R-Haynes 297-311.

38

R-Haynes 1312-1315.

39

R-Haynes 1-9, 54-55.

40

R-Haynes 189-209.

4,

R-Haynes 1155-1161, 1165-1170.
8

Following discovery, Jacobs moved for summary judgment on its claim for public
road determination.42 Boyers joined in the motion.43 The trial court denied the motion.44
On October 3, 2007, the trial court, counsel, and parties participated in a day-long
journey to the property at issue, crossing the Haynes and Jacob properties while counsel and
others pointed out various sites.45
A bench trial was held March 4-7, with oral arguments on March 11, 2008.46 At the
beginning of trial, Haynes stipulated that Jacobs had a prescriptive easement over the Bench
Road consistent with historical use.47 The trial court issued a memorandum decision on
March 21,2008, finding essentially that the Bench Road was public, the Middle Fork Road
was public to a point just short of Boyer Lake, and that the East Fork Road was public to the
middle of section 8. The court stated that it would fix the width of the road at 18 feet if
called upon to make a width decision, but held that the width should instead be determined
by Summit County.48

42

R-Haynes 536-540.

43

R-Haynes 907-909.

44

R-Haynes 912-962.

45

R-Haynes 1036-1037, 1401-1402.

46

R-Haynes 1319-1327, 1339-1340.

47

Transcript vol. I, 13-14.

48

R-Haynes 1393-1477.

All parties raised various objections to the trial court's ruling. Haynes primarily
sought reconsideration of the delegation of the width determination to Summit County49 and
objected to the form of order presented by Jacobs.50 Jacobs moved to reopen to present
evidence on width.51 Boyers moved to reconsider the grant to the Water Users of an
easement over the Boyer property.52 The trial court made minor modifications to the form
of order but otherwise denied the post-trial motions.53 Haynes appealed54 the trial court's
decision, and Jacobs and Boyers cross-appealed.55
C.

Statement of Facts
The Chalk Creek Road, State Road 133, travels generally easterly from Coalville (in

Summit County), through Upton, and eventually to Wyoming. The road at issue in this case
departs to the south off the highway about seven miles east of Upton, along the East Fork of
Chalk Creek.56 A map of the properties and roads is in the appendix for the convenience of
the Court.

49

R-Haynes 1500-1503, 1504-1521.

50

R-Haynes 1522-1520, 1530-1544.

51

R-Haynes 1478-1481, 1482-1492.

52

R-Haynes 1606-1608, 1609-1618.

53

R-Haynes 1678-1692.

54

R-Haynes 1711-1715.

55

R-Haynes 1716-1720, 1721-1725.

56

R-Haynes 1405.
10

Haynes own approximately 10,000 acres of property in this area, with the northern
portion of the Haynes property adjacent to Highway 133. Jacobs also own approximately
10,000 acres in the same area; their property is generally south and west of the Haynes
property. The primary access to the Jacobs property is over the Haynes property.57 Various
paths of travel have existed over the properties, including particularly a rough road that loops
through the properties. The road begins at Highway 133 and travels generally south over the
Haynes property to the Jacobs property (Bench Road), then south and east over the Jacobs
property (Middle Fork Road) to a reservoir (Boyer Lake) on property owned by the Chalk
Creek-Hoytsville Water Users Corporation. The Boyer parties have an undivided interest
(together with Triple H Ranch) in approximately 37 acres of property in five non-contiguous
parcels surrounding Boyer Lake. From the Boyer Lake the road travels generally south and
west across the Haynes property (East Fork Road) to join the Bench Road south of Highway
133.58
The roads at issue were narrow, two-track roads ranging from 8 feet 10 feet in width.59
The initial two miles of the Bench Road on the Haynes property was recently improved and
now has an average width of 18 feet, but historically it was also 8 to 10 feet wide.60 The

'Exhibit 117; R-Haynes 1403-1404.
*R-Haynes 1406-1409; Exhibit 117.
'Transcript vol. 1,149-150; vol. II, 331-332; vol. Ill, 611,620; vol. IV, 712,797,818.
^ T r a n s c r i p t v o l . IV, 821.
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entire loop is on private property and bounded by extensive private properties on both sides
of the road - there are no public destinations for which the road affords access.61
Howard Haynes, a sheep rancher and father of the original principals of Haynes Land
& Livestock Co., purchased the northern part of the Haynes property in 1932.62 He leased
the remainder of what is now the Haynes property and purchased it in 1940 and 1941.63
From the time of his purchase in 1932 he maintained a policy of locking the gates for 24
hours at least once each year, and also restricted access during the hunting seasons and at
other times.64
Irv Jacobs and A.E. Christensen, the predecessors of the current defendants (jointly
referred to in this brief as "Jacobs"), purchased their property in 1938.65 Jacobs have
maintained a locked gate at the entrance to their property for as long as anyone can
remember, and prior to this lawsuit the Jacobs believed their road was private.66
Evidentially because the parties did not then believe a public road existed, in 1939 the
predecessor to the Haynes interest conveyed to Jacobs's predecessor an express easement
over the Bench Road allowing the owners of the Jacobs property to cross the Haynes property

61

See R-Haynes 1466.

62

Transcript vol. Ill, 608-609.

63

Exhibit 48; Transcript vol. Ill, 609, 645.

64

Transcript vol. Ill, 612, 613-617, 676-677, 709, 722, 771.

65

Transcript vol. II, 262.

66

Transcript vol. I, 166, 199, 243, 335.
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for limited agricultural purposes.67 Haynes stipulated at trial that Jacobs have also acquired
a prescriptive easement over the Bench Road for recreational and other purposes relating to
the existing and historical uses of the property.68 A 1975 map of Class D roads (unimproved
county roads) in Summit County shows the entire loop of the road as a public road.69 Summit
County stipulated, however, that there was no evidence the map had ever been officially
adopted or approved by the Summit County commission.70
Jacobs constructed three "cabins" on their property without objection from the
Haynes.71 When Brian Garff began building a large fourth cabin, however, and Jacobs
sought to expand their use beyond the scope of the historical deeded easement,72 Haynes filed
this action to quiet title to the Haynes property and to restrict access to the historical uses.
The trial court found that the Bench Road, most of the Middle Fork Road, and a short
section of the East Fork Road became public based on use from 1880 to 1896.73 At that time,
the even numbered sections were owned by the railroad, and the odd numbered sections were

67

Exhibits 7-9.

68

Transcript vol. I, 13-14.

69

Exhibitll4.

70

Transcript vol. IV, 876.

7l

Transcript vol. I, 121, 186; vol. II, 273-274; vol. Ill, 625.

72

Transcript vol. II, p. 405.

73

R-Haynes 1459.
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federal land.74 Historical documents show that during that period a few homesteaders staked
claims on the property and a few sawmills were operated in the area.75 There are also reports
of individuals hunting and fishing in the area.76 Additional detail concerning this evidence
is presented in the argument section below.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Where a court declares that a road has been abandoned and dedicated to the public by
public use, the court may either leave the road at its existing width or declare the width
necessary to accommodate the historic uses. The court may not, however, delegate the
determination of width to a county, especially where that county is a party to the lawsuit.
Fixing the width of a road that has become public by use is a judicial function that cannot be
delegated. Utah cases uniformly hold that it is the court that determines width; no case
authorizes delegating that decision to a county. Utah Code § 72-5-108 authorizes a county
to set minimum road standards, but does not give a county authority to "find" the width of
a road dedicated to the public by use.
This Court should fix the width of the road at 18 feet, in accordance with express
findings made by the trial court. In the event this Court determines to remand for additional
proceedings, however, this Court should clarify that the width of the road is only that
currently necessary to support the historical (1880-1896) uses. Current uses or contemplated
74

Exhibit 127; transcript vol. I, 87.

15

E.g., Exhibits 137, 142.

16

E.g., Exhibits 139, 161.
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future uses should not be considered. Any other standard would unconstitutionally allow the
public to take more than the landowner abandoned, without paying just compensation.
Haynes was entitled to a decree quieting title against all roads except those proved by
the defendants. Haynes proved record title to the property. The burden of proof to establish
any exceptions to that title rested on defendants. Defendants proved some roads. Haynes
was entitled to a decree that no other roads existed.
No evidence was presented often years continuous public use of the East Fork Road.
Similarly, the evidence regarding use of the Bench Road was not clear and convincing that
members of the public used the road for ten continuous years. Occasional use by individuals
looking for a homestead site is too sporadic to qualify as continuous public use; use by the
homesteaders themselves is not use by the public. Sawmill operators had permission to build
their sawmills; use of the road by their customers was similarly permissive.

Most

importantly, all this land was wild, unenclosed land, and this Court should hold that public
use of such lands is presumed permissive.

15

ARGUMENT
I:

A.

ANY INCREASE IN WIDTH OF A ROAD DEDICATED TO THE
PUBLIC BY USE MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE COURT;
THE COUNTY CANNOT TAKE A WIDER PATH THAN THAT
ABANDONED BY THE LANDOWNER.

Utah Cases Uniformly Hold That Where a Road Is Dedicated to the Public by Use,
the Court Determines the Width of the Road; No Case Holds Width Is Determined by
the County.
The Order and Final Judgment entered by the trial court declared that certain roads

have become public under the road dedication statute,77 and then decreed: "The width of the
portions of the Road that have been declared a public way shall be determined by Summit
County, Utah according to that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel based
on the facts and circumstances."78 The trial court made this delegation to Summit County
based on the court's interpretation of Utah Code § 72-5-108, which states: "The width of
rights-of-way for public highways shall be set as the highway authorities of the state,
counties, or municipalities may determine for the highways under their respective
jurisdiction."
The discussion below shows that delegating the road width determination was
improper. Section 72-5-108 merely authorizes a highway authority to set road standards that
must be satisfied by, for example, new roads or roads serving new developments. The statute
does not and could not authorize a highway authority to take without just compensation

77

Utah Code §72-5-104.

78

R-Haynes 16974 12.
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whatever additional property is necessary to enable an existing road to meet those standards.
A court adjudicating a road dedication case can either find road width based on the evidence,
or if inadequate evidence was presented the court can make no width determination and leave
the road at its existing width. But, a court cannot delegate to a county or other highway
authority the factual determination of how much width the landowner dedicated and
abandoned to the public.
Section 72-5-108 or a predecessor statute has been in effect in Utah since at least
1917.79 During this time of nearly 100 years, and in fact extending prior to the statute's
enactment back to at least 1887, numerous decisions of the Utah appellate courts have
directly or by implication confirmed that the width of a road abandoned to the public under
the road dedication statute is determined by the court.80

' • •

79

1917 Utah Laws ch. 74 § 1117.

*°E.g. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Corp.,
909 P.2d 225,232 (Utah 1995) (It is "proper and necessary for the court in defining the road
to determine its width[.]"); Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah
1995) ("[Determination of road width] depends upon the full adjudication of the relevant
facts that will be unearthed at trial."); Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v.
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987) (trial court fixed width at ten feet);
Schaerv. State,657?.2d 1337,1342 (Utah 1983) ("width of the highway presents a question
of fact"); Memmott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982) (case remanded for further
findings on the issue of width); Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d
211,213 (Utah 1981) (trial court set the width at 30 feet); Blonquist v. Blonquist, 30 Utah
2d 234,236, 516 P.2d 343, 344 (1973) ("brought before the court to determine the width of
the roadway"); Hunsaker v. State, 29 Utah 2d 322, 325-326, 509 P.2d 352, 355 (1973)
("Even without the statutory presumption as to the width of the highway, the evidence in the
instant case concerning the location of fences and the usual width of the highway in the
vicinity is sufficient to sustain the determination of the trial court."); Clark v. Erekson, 9
Utah 2d 212, 214, 341 P.2d 424, 426 (1959) ("There is also no merit to appellants'
contention that there is insufficient evidence to support the court's finding as to the width of
17

There is no reported Utah decision delegating that decision to a county or other
legislative body. In at least one decision, the trial court elected to make no decision as to
road width, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's right to make no decision
"when that issue was not the focus of the litigation."81 But, making no decision is not the
same as specifically delegating the decision to a county. If the trial court makes no decision,
the parties are left with the road in its existing condition. At that point, section 72-5-108
would not authorize a county to declare a width wider than the existing width without making
just compensation,82 any more than that county would have authority to widen any other road
without making just compensation.

the road."); Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 398, 326 P.2d 107, 109 (1958) (the trial court on
remand must determine "the width of the highway, which must be determined in accordance
with what is reasonable and necessary for the uses to which the road has been put"); Deseret
Livestock Co. v. Sharp, 123 Utah 353,357,259 P.2d 607,610 (1953) (trial court determined
road width was 100 feet); Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1,9,116 P.2d 420,424 (1941) ("A
particular use having been established, such width should be decreed by the court as will
make such use convenient and safe."); Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 75 Utah
384, 392, 285 P. 646, 649 (1929) ("We further approve the findings and conclusion of the
court as to the width of the road."); Whitesides v. Green, 13 Utah 341, 349-350,44 P. 1032,
1033 (1896)"(width must be determined from a consideration of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to the case"); Burrows v. Guest, 5 Utah 91, 99, 12 P. 847, 851 (1887) (width "is a
question of fact for the jury"); Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 914 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
("Because the trial court failed to make this determination [concerning road width], we
remand for this limited purpose."); Jennings Investment, LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009
UT App 119, \ 34 (width determination reversed because not supported by adequate
findings; cause remanded to trial court to determine the reasonable and necessary width of
the road).
%x

Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Corp., 909
P.2d 225, 232 (Utah 1995).
n

See constitutional arguments at page 30 below.
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Under the trial court's interpretation of section 72-5-108, a county could, without any
judicial process whatsoever, simply decide that a historically two-track road eight feet wide
was now going to be 36 feet wide, or 66 feet wide, or more, all without paying any
compensation to the owner of the property affected. The same logic would permit a county
to increase the width of any other public road, without incurring an obligation to pay just
compensation to the affected landowner.

Such a taking would obviously violate the

constitutional protections of private property.83
Notably, neither Jacobs nor the trial court identified any decision which approved
delegating the road width determination to a county or other legislative entity.
Section 72-5-108 and its predecessor statutes have been reenacted or modified several
times over the last century, but the essential provisions of the statutes have remained
constant. Comp. Laws 1917, § 1117,84 enacted in 1917, provided:
The width of rights of way for State roads shall be such
as will meet with the approval of the State Road Commission,
and the widths of rights of way to be used for county roads,
alleys, lanes, trails, private highways, and by-roads shall be
such as may be deemed necessary by the Board of County
Commissioners; provided, that nothing in this Act shall be so
construed as to increase or diminish the width of either kind of
highways already established or used as such; provided, further,
that nothing in this Act contained shall prevent cities from
laying out, establishing, opening or accepting the dedication of

See arguments at page 30 below.
Enacted by 1917 Utah Laws ch. 74 § 2.
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streets, avenues, boulevards and alleys of any width the council
of such cities shall deem proper.85
In the 1943 codification of the Utah Code, the section appeared as follows:
The width of rights of way for state roads shall be such
as the state road commission may determine, and the width of
rights of way to be used for county highways shall be such as
may be deemed necessary by the board of county
commissioners; provided, that nothing in this title shall prevent
cities or towns from laying out, establishing or opening, or
accepting the dedication of, streets and alleys of any width the
governing body thereof shall deem proper.86
In 1963 the provision was reenacted as follows:
The width of rights-of-way for public highways shall be
such as the highway authorities of the state, counties, cities or
towns may determine for such highways under their respective
jurisdiction.87
The statute was amended to its present form in 1998:
The width of rights-of-way for public highways shall be
set as the highway authorities of the state, counties, or
municipalities may determine for the highways under their
respective jurisdiction.88

85

Comp. Laws Utah § 1117 (1907) (italics added). The predecessor to this section
was Utah Rev. Stat. § 25-1-1117 (1898), which stated: "The width of all public highways,
except bridges, alleys, lanes, and trails, shall be at least sixty-six feet. The width of all
private highways and by-roads, except bridges, shall be at least twenty fee; provided, that
nothing in this title shall be so construed as to increase or diminish the width of either kind
of highway already established or used as such."
86

Utah Code Ann. § 36-1-4 (1943).

87

1963 Utah Laws, ch. 39, § 93 (codified at Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-93).

88

Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108 (2001) (enacted by 1998 Utah Laws, ch. 270, § 136).
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"A well-established canon of statutory construction provides that where a legislature
amends a portion of a statute but leaves other portions unamended, or re-enacts them without
change, the legislature is presumed to have been satisfied with prior judicial constructions
of the unchanged portions of the statute and to have adopted them as consistent with its own
intent.89 This Court should, therefore, hold that the meaning of section 72-5-108 is consistent
with the long line of court decisions holding that the width of a road dedicated by use is to
be determined by a court, not by a legislative body.
This is confirmed by recent changes to the road dedication statute. After the
commencement of this case, section 72-5-104 was amended to clarify that"[t]he scope of the
right of way is that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel according to the
facts and circumstances."90 This provision is substantive, and therefore cannot apply to this
action.91 This provision illustrates, however, that section 72-2-108 does not apply to road
dedication cases. If determination of road width were already governed by section 72-2-108,
there would have been no reason to enact a separate provision in section 72-5-104 stating the
factors to be considered in determining road width. Also, if the Legislature disagreed with
the numerous cases holding that width is set by the court and intended that road width be

^ Christensen v. Industrial Comm 'n, 642 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982).
90

Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3) (2001).

91

"A 'substantive' change, or one that affects substantive rights, may not be applied
retroactively." Brown & Root Indus, Serv. v. Industrial Comm 'n, 947 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah
1997). As a practical matter, however, subsection (3) essentially restated existing case law
as to the width of the road.
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determined by a county rather than the court, the Legislature would have been expected to
state that explicitly in section 72-5-104.
The initial enactment of this provision also confirms that its purpose was to set
standards, not to allow the highway authority to take additional land. Comp. Laws 1917, §
1117,92 enacted in 1917, provided: "nothing in this Act shall be so construed as to increase
or diminish the width of either kind of highways already established or used as such[.]"93
This Court should hold that section 72-5-108 does not authorize a county or highway
authority to fix the initial width of a road dedicated by public use. That statute permits a
county to set minimum standards for certain types of roads, but does not permit the county
to take additional property to meet those standards. The trial court's decision to delegate the
determination of width to the County should be reversed.
B.

Determinating the Width of a Road Dedicated by Use Is a Core Judicial Function
That Cannot Be Delegated to the County.
"Article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution . . . provides that the judicial power

of the state shall be vested in the courts."94 The trial court delegated to Summit County the
authority to conclude this litigation by determining the width of the road that had been
dedicated to the public. Such a delegation of a core judicial function violates the separation
of powers doctrine inherent in the Utah Constitution.
92

Enacted by 1917 Utah Laws ch. 74 § 2.

93

Comp. Laws Utah § 1117 (1907) (italics added). The predecessor to this section,
Utah Rev. Stat. § 25-1-1117 (1898), contained a similar provision.
94

SaltLake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 848 (Utah 1994).
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"The term 'judicial power of courts' is generally understood to be the power to hear
and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation."95 The
authorities cited in subpoint I. A. above show that determination of road width is an integral
part of a road dedication case. Determining width is part of determining the controversy
between the adverse parties. The "legislature is not free to authorize by statute other
persons" to perform such core judicial functions.96 It follows that section 72-5-108 cannot
constitutionally permit a trial court to delegate the determination of road width to a county
legislative body.
There is an inherent difference between determining road width in a case involving
road dedication by use, and the decision a public road authority makes in fixing standards
applicable to a county road to be used for development or other county-approved purposes.
In a road dedication case, the road width determines the amount of private property dedicated
by the private landowner. Fixing that width (finding what the landowner voluntarily gave
to the public) is an inherently factual determination. The decision of a legislative body, in
contrast, is based on policy considerations concerning aesthetics, ease of maintenance, and
potential future expansion, among other factors. A county is an institutionally poor forum
for finding facts-the trial court gave no explanation of how the County is to receive evidence,

95

Id. at 848 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

96

Id. at 856-57 (Howe, J., concurring) (because Justice Howe's concurring opinion
was joined by Justice Stewart and Justice Russon, it represents the view of the majority of
the court.
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or even if the County is required to consider evidence from the parties.97 A county is not a
proper forum to resolve the inherently factual issues of what width was abandoned to the
public.
The principle that a court, not the county, must determine road width is confirmed in
several cases. In Schaer v. Utah Dept. of Transportation?* the trial court fixed the width of
a road based on city ordinances. The Utah Supreme Court rejected that approach:
In granting the plaintiffs motion, the trial court
apparently relied on the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City
§ 42-7-5 (1975), as establishing the width of the dugway road at
fifty feet as a matter of law. This reliance was misplaced. That
ordinance merely sets forth the minimum standards and
requirements regarding the widths of streets in a proposed
subdivision plan. It does not address the reasonable and
necessary width of a highway dedicated to the public under
U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-89. However, even though that
ordinance does not establish the width of the dugway road as a
matter of law, it may be offered as evidence of what is
considered reasonable and necessary under the circumstances."
If it is improper to rely solely on municipal ordinances to establish width, it follows it would
be even more improper to just turn the matter over to the municipality. In Kohler v.
Martin™ this Court reversed because "the trial court erred in failing to assess the reasonable

97

Although the trial court expressly assumed the County would "conduct hearings and
consider input," R-Haynes 1687, in fact on December 17, 2008, the County by resolution
fixed the road width at 36 feet without holding any hearing or allowing any input whatsoever.
98

657P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983).

"Id. at 1342 (italics added).
100

916 P.2d 910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
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and necessary width of the roadway."101 Similarly, the supreme court in Boyer v. Clark102
directed that the trial court determine the width of the road on remand.103
The impropriety of allowing the County to determine the width of the road is further
supported by analogy to a road acquired by condemnation. If a county were to condemn a
right of way for a county road, the width of that road would be specifically determined. No
one would claim the county could then go back and determine that a greater width was
necessary, and take that greater width without a further condemnation proceeding and
appropriate payment. Yet, that is exactly the authority the trial court purported to give the
County here. The trial court found portions of the roads at issue were dedicated to the public.
The width thus dedicated to the public is whatever it is, and it is not subject to further
expansion based on what the County might think is necessary.
It must be remembered that Summit County is a party to this action, not an
independent adjudicative body. Delegating the width determination to the County in essence
says to the County, "You won. Now take as much property as you want - feel free to choose
how wide you want the road to be." Such a delegation of adjudicative authority to a party
cannot be permitted.
Determination of the road width must be based on factual findings concerning the
historical use of the road and what is currently reasonable and necessary to support the
l0l

/J.at914.

102

7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107 (1958).

103

/</.at398,326P.2datl09.
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historical use.104 Evidence on all of this was before the trial court. In fact, the trial court
expressly stated its finding, for use in the event the delegation to the County were reversed:
"If the court is responsible to declare a width the court believes the evidence and law allow
the court to declare the road should be 18 feet in width."105 "The court defers to the county
but if the court is wrong, rather than return to court, the above conclusions are the court's
view on the matter."106
This Court should hold that the trial court was wrong in deputizing the County to
determine the width of the road abandoned and dedicated to the public. Such factual findings
are judicial functions, and not properly delegated to a county legislative body. This Court
should reverse the order delegating the road width determination to Summit County.
C.

This Court Should Remand with Instructions to Fix the Road Width at 18 Feet in
Accordance with the Trial Court's Findings.
The trial court recognized that its decision to delegate the road width determination

to Summit County might be reversed, and made express findings to be used in that event.
The trial court stated:
58.
. . . Again, the cases seem to say it is the court's
responsibility but to this court the statute seems to say otherwise.
If the court is responsible to declare a width the court believes
the evidence and law allow the court to declare the road should
be 18 feet in width....

m

Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 9, 116 P.2d 420, 424 (1941).

105

R-Haynes 1473.

106

R-Haynes 1474.
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59. ... The court defers to the county but if the court
is wrong, rather than return to court, the above conclusions are
the court's view on the matter.107
As explained above, this Court should hold that it was the trial court's responsibility
to declare the width of the road. Consistent with the trial court's express finding, this Court
should remand to the trial court for entry of judgment fixing the width at 18 feet.
II:

HAYNES WAS ENTITLED TO A DECREE QUIETING TITLE
AGAINST ALL UNRECORDED ACCESS CLAIMS BEYOND
THOSE EXPRESSLY FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT.

Paragraph 16 and other paragraphs of Haynes's Verified Complaint sought to quiet
title in Haynes against all claims of access by Jacobs. The trial court denied that claim as to
the Bench Road and part of the East Fork Road, but refused to expressly decree that Jacobs
had no other rights over the Haynes property. One road at issue is the road to Red Hole.
Some witnesses testified to using the road, but the trial court did not find any public or
prescriptive rights over that road. The trial court described the road, which it labeled as the
West Fork Road, as one "about which there seems little dispute."108 The trial court did not,
however, determine that any party had obtained prescriptive or other rights to use that road.
Where Haynes proved title to its property, Haynes was entitled to a decree quieting
title in Haynes subject only to easements of record and the specific roads the trial court found
to exist.
Haynes sought the following relief:
107

R-Haynes 1473-1474.

108

R-Haynes 1408.
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B.
A declaratory judgment under Count II hereof
adjudging that plaintiff is the owner and holder of the legal,
equitable and record title to all of the Haynes Property free and
clear of any and all right, title and interest of Garff and/or Jacob
therein and thereto, except as expressly provided by the
Agreement, Exhibit "D" attached hereto.
C.
A declaratory judgment under Count III hereof
adjudging (a) that all of the roadways located upon the Haynes
Property and the Jacob/Christensen property including the
portions thereof which the County has heretofore erroneously
designated as public and/or county roads, are in fact private and
have never been and are not now public and/or county roads ..
109

Jacobs stipulated that Haynes had record title to the property.110 "[0]nce [a] quiet title
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of ownership, defendant has the burden of going
forward with proof of his challenge to plaintiffs title."111 Therefore, Jacobs had the burden
of proof to establish any unrecorded easements that it claimed may exist over the Haynes
property.
The trial court found a public road existed over the Bench Road and some portions
of the East Fork Road, but did not find any other public roads over the Haynes property.
Haynes acknowledged a prescriptive easement over the Bench Road; Jacobs did not prove
any other prescriptive easements. Haynes was therefore entitled to a quiet title decree

109

R-Haynes 8. See also Verified Complaintffi|16,20 (R-Haynes 4, 5).

li0

Transcriptv. 1,9-10.

111

Baxter v. Utah Dep 't of Tramp., 783 P.2d 1045,1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), citing
Gatrell v. Salt Lake County, 106 Utah 409, 411, 149 P.2d 827, 827 (1944). See also
Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 788 P.2d 520, 524
(Utah 1990).
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determining that Jacobs do not have any rights of access over the Haynes property other than
those already of record or specifically found by the trial court. The case should be remanded
with directions to enter a decree in favor of Haynes determining that the parties to this action
have no rights over or on the Haynes property other than rights of record and those
specifically found by the trial court.
Ill:

THE TRIAL COURT ON REMAND SHOULD DETERMINE
THE ROAD WIDTH BASED ON THE WIDTH AND NATURE
OF USE FROM 1880 TO 1896.

Haynes argues above in point I.C. that this Court should remand with directions to
declare the road width is 18 feet. If, however, this Court determines to remand this case for
findings as to road width, the Court should give guidance to the trial court by clarifying that
the width of the roads must be determined in light of the use at the time of dedication, not
contemplated future uses. The trial court found the roads were dedicated to the public by
public use from 1880 to 1896,112 so the width should be such as would accommodate the uses
made of the road from 1880 to 1896. Determining road width based on historical uses is
required by Utah decisions and is compelled by constitutional considerations. The law
relating to road width was disputed before the trial court,113 so clarification of the law for the
benefit of the trial court on remand will promote judicial efficiency.114

-R-Haynes 1459,^42.
'See, e.g., R-Haynes 1469 \ 54.
{

Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, \ 38, 70 P.3d 35, 46.
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Utah Code section 72-5-104(1) provides that a road can become "dedicated and
abandoned" to the public by ten years continuous public use. That law must be interpreted,
however, to avoid conflict with the private property rights guaranteed by both the Utah and
United States constitutions.115 Section 22 of Article I of the Utah Constitution declares:
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution similarly states: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation." The only interpretation of
section 72-5-104( 1) consistent with these constitutional protections is that a landowner may,
through inaction, dedicate or abandon his or her property, but the public cannot take that
property without compensation. A Louisiana court recognized this distinction, holding that
the public authority could not take a road unless the landowner's knowing acquiescence in
public use and maintenance "amounts to a tacit dedication by the landowner - a giving by
the landowner rather than a taking by the public authority."116 The dedication statute is really
only a rule of evidence that defines what constitutes abandonment or dedication to the public
- it cannot give the public a right to take property without compensation.
Consistent with the concept that a landowner can abandon but the public cannot take,
the scope and width of the easement must be limited to that which the landowner abandoned.
While a landowner might voice no objection to public use of a narrow path and thereby
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Thumwaldv. A.E., 2007 UT 38,14, 163 P.3d 623, 625; Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re
Estate ofS.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, t 26, 144 P.3d 1083, 1091.
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Vaughn v. Williams, 345 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
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dedicate that path to the public, the landowner might have made strenuous objection to use
of a wider path. The public cannot take a wider path than the landowner abandoned.
Utah cases are generally consistent with this principle. The law was summarized by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit as follows:
A right of way is not tantamount to fee simple ownership of a
defined parcel of territory. Rather, it is an entitlement to use
certain land in a particular way. To convert a two-track jeep
trail into a graded dirt road, or a graded road into a paved one,
alters the use, affects the servient estate, and may go beyond the
scope of the right of way. See [Sierra Club v.] Hodel, 848 F.2d
[1068] at 1083 [(10th Cir. 1988)] ("surely no Utah case would
hold that a road which had always been two-lane with marked
and established fence lines, could be widened to accommodate
eight lanes of traffic"); Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1,116
P.2d 420,424 (Utah 1941) ("the use to which the way has been
put measures the extent of the right to use";"[a] bridle path
abandoned to the public may not be expanded, by court decree,
into a boulevard"). This does not mean that no changes can ever
be made, but that any improvements must be made in light of the
traditional uses to which the right of way had been put, fixed as
of October 21, 1976. Hodel, 848 F.2d at 1084.117
While "the width of a public road is determined according to what is reasonable and
necessary under all the facts and circumstances,"118 that width can only be the width
necessary to accommodate the historical use. Any more expansive width would result in an
unconstitutional taking of private land without compensation.
The roads at issue are narrow, two-track paths. With the exception of the first two
miles on the Haynes property which was recently improved and widened, the testimony at
7

S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735, 747-748 (10th Cir. 2005).

l

Memmott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted).
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trial established the roads were 8 to 10 feet wide. The historical use has been primarily
limited to agricultural purposes. The roads are already of adequate width for their historical
purposes, and no widening of the roads would be justified. Jacobs were able to use the roads
in the current condition for large cement trucks, dump trucks, satellite transmission semi
truck and trailer, and other large vehicles.119 There was no testimony showing that any
greater width (than the current 8-10 feet) was needed.
Jacob argued below, however, that the width should meet current development
standards for a subdivision.120 This Court should clarify that the width of the road is limited
to that necessary to accommodate historical use from 1880 to 1896.
IV:

A.

THE HISTORICAL RECORDS DID NOT PROVIDE CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF TEN YEARS PUBLIC USE
OF THE ROADS.

The Controlling Evidence Was Documentary and Not Disputed; this Court Should
Therefore Make Its Own Determination as to the Legal Effect of the Evidence.
The trial court found a public road was created by use of the roads from 1880 to

1896.121 Obviously, there were no witnesses who could testify from personal knowledge
about that period, and the proof was thus primarily from documents.122 This Court is in as
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E.g., transcript vol. I, 188-220.

120

£.g.,R-Haynes 1485-1487.

121

R-Haynes 1459.

122

R-Haynes 1441.
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good a position as the trial court to interpret those documents, and may review the facts de

This is consistent with the observation of the trial court: "It does not appear as if the
!

facts are in great dispute, but the legal consequences of those facts is where this dispute is
centered."124
The evidence regarding use of the Bench Road is marshaled as follows; the following
subpoints show this evidence did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of continuous
public use for ten years:
Evidence that roads and physical signs of use existed.
1875: The road appeared on maps and is described in survey notes beginning in 1875.
Exhibits 101-105, 108-109; Transcript vol. I, 59-68. The road is in substantially the same
location as at present. Exhibit 296.
1893: A vacant cabin is reflected in the survey notes from October 1893. The cabin
is located at point K.125 Transcript vol. I, 61.

m

Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Bench v. Bechtel Civil &
Minerals, Inc., 758 P.2d 460, 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
124

R-Haynes 1403. See also R-Haynes 1440: "The court finds and concludes in this
case there are very, very few credibility determinations at issue of any importance. Almost
all the witnesses are found to be honest and credible and they saw events as they believed
them to be from their perspective. Almost none of the court's decisions are governed by
credibility determinations."
125

All references to a physical point and letter refer to the Exhibit 117 map, a copy of
which appears in the appendix to this brief.
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Exhibit 105, the field notes of an 1893 survey, notes a corral at point D. Transcript
vol. I, 61. The survey notes also indicate a wagon road and old sawmill site at point A.
Transcript vol. I, 64.
1894: The 1894 maps show the Bench Road existed, the Middle Fork Road existed
to the point where it enters section 33 near Boyer Lake, and the East Fork Road existed from
the fork on the Bench Road to the middle of section 8. Exhibits 110-112; transcript vol. I,
67-70.
A cabin existed at point K. Exhibit 111; transcript vol. I, 69.
An old sawmill existed at point A, and a corral existed at point D. Exhibit 112;
transcript vol. I, 70.
The Randall cabin existed at point F. Exhibit 112, transcript vol. I, 71.
A meadow or irrigated field existed at point G. Exhibit 112, transcript vol. I, 71.
An old sawmill existed at point I. Exhibit 112, transcript vol. I, 71.
Evidence of use.
1863: L. L. Randall owned and operated a sawmill "about two miles up from Pine
Cliff, in the East Fork of Calk [sic] Creek." Exhibit 137, control number JC 2366; transcript
vol. I, 93. Merrett T. Staley also operated a sawmill. Id. The Randall sawmill was built in
1863, and the "lumber was used extensively in the construction and enlarging of Fort
Bridger, and homes in Coalville." Exhibit 142; transcript vol. I, 96-97. The sawmill was
operated for many years. Exhibit 158, control number JC 2587.
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1865: Exhibit 131 reflects that on September 4, 1865, the county court granted a
petition of L.L. Randall, Jacob Huffman, and others "to control saw timber on Chalk creek
kanyon [sic]," and that "[t]he citizens shall have the privilege to haul logs to said mill and
have them sawed on shares of one half." Transcript vol. I, 90-91.
1883-1901: William Staley settled on a homestead at point E in July 1883 and resided
there until at least 1901 when a patent was issued. Exhibit 119; transcript vol. I, 77-78.
1883-1903: Leonard Randall settled on a homestead at point F in July 1882 and
resided there until at least 1903 when a patent was issued. Exhibit 120; transcript vol. I, 8082.
1884: Exhibit 129 shows that water was being put to beneficial use in 1884, with a
point of diversion near the Red Hole area. Transcript vol. I, 89.
1893: George Huff diverted water for a ditch in 1893. Exhibit 130; Transcript vol.
1,90.
1894-1898: John Clark maintained a dipping corral at point H; the dipping corral
existed in 1894. Exhibits 105, 112; transcript vol. I, 63, 71-72. A newspaper article on
August 8,1895 stated that 40,000 sheep had been dipped at the dipping corral and that Clark
expected to dip 100,000 sheep. Exhibit 150; transcript vol. I, 102. A newspaper article
October 13, 1896, stated about over 100,000 sheep had been dipped that season. Exhibit
151; transcript vol. 1,102-103. A newspaper article dated June 22,1898, stated that dipping
would commence at Clark's dipping corral on or about the first of July. Exhibit 152;
transcript vol. I, 103.
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1895-1901: George Huff settled on a homestead at point B in December 1893, and
resided there until at least 1901 when a patent was issued. Exhibit 121; Transcript vol. I, 83.
1896-1903: Charles Saxton settled on a homestead at point C in July 1896 and resided
there until at least October 1903 when a patent was issued. Exhibit 122; Transcript vol. I,
84.
1913: The Summit County commission authorized the expenditure of county funds
for improvement of the Sage Brush Flat road in Chalk Creek, which the trial court found to
be the Bench Road as described in this litigation. Exhibit 244; transcript vol. Ill, 561; RHaynesl4191J41.
Testimony not specific as to date
Sam Banner hunted bear and other animals in the Red Hole area. Exhibit 139;
transcript vol. I, 94-96.
Sheep men and sawmill people would attend functions at the Upton ward. Exhibit
142, control number JC 2443; transcript vol. I, 97.
Mrytle Rigby, bom December 3,1888, homesteaded in the Chalk Creek area in 1916.
A history written in 1983 states: "Sundays were especially fun and exciting at Chalk Creek
Ranch in the summer. More frequently than not there were city visitors. A bountiful lunch
was prepared. Favorite horses were saddled, a team harnessed to the white-top surrey, and
everyone was off to Blue Lake or Bear River to fish." Exhibit 160 at JC 1649; transcript vol.
I, 109.
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The minutes of the Summit County commissioners for September 2,1947, state that
the fish and game warden "asked that an investigation be made as to the status of the Road
through Howard Haynes Property, and leading to Blue Lake, as Mr. Haynes had closed the
road to the public and the same had been used generally by the public for a long time."
Exhibit 133; transcript vol. I, 92. The minutes state the matter will be taken up with the
county attorney, but there is no indication an investigation occurred or what the result might
have been of any investigation. Id.
B.

Private Property Rights Are Constitutionally Protected and Can Be Overcome Only
by Clear and Convincing Evidence.
The trial court here stated, "This case is a very, very difficult case for the court and

it is not a clear cut case at all."126 For the reasons expressed below, Haynes respectfully
submit that the evidence in this case was not clear and convincing, and did not establish
continuous public use for the required ten years.
Private property rights have constitutional protection. As stated above, Section 22 of
Article I of the Utah Constitution declares: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation." The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution similarly states: "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation."
Consistent with the constitutional prohibition of taking private property without just
compensation, "a party seeking to establish dedication and abandonment under this statute

'R-Haynes 1439.
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[Utah Code § 72-5-104] bears the burden of doing so by clear and convincing evidence."127
Additionally, the trial court is required to view the evidence in these cases in light of the
"presumption" that exists "in favor of the property owner."128
The reason for requiring this higher standard of proof in public road cases is clear.
As explained by the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he law does not lightly allow the transfer of
property from private to public use

This higher standard of proof is demanded since the

ownership of property should be granted a high degree of sanctity and respect."129 In an
earlier public roads case, the Utah Supreme Court similarly stressed that "[w]here individual
property rights are at stake, we must not treat such rights lightly."130
Haynes respectfully submit that claims based on conj ecture and inference from ancient
records cannot meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence. A journal entry
indicating, for example, that a person ended up at Blue Lake does not clearly and
convincingly establish that the person followed a particular primitive, rough road to get there.
This is particularly true if the individual was likely riding a horse or hiking such that travel
across open meadows off the road could have occurred. The court in Southern Utah

ni

Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, f 9, 179 P.3d 768, 773 (citations
omitted).
m

Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097,1099 (Utah 1995) (quoting Leo
M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981)).
129

Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1099.

^Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d 545, 546 (1968).
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Wilderness Alliance v. BLMm noted that "litigants are driven to the historical archives for
documentation of matters no one had reason to document at the time."132 These records
simply do not have the level of detail on each element of a dedication claim that is
constitutionally required to justify impairing private property rights.
C.

Occasional Limited Use by Homesteaders, Hunters, and Other Such Persons Does
Not Create a Public Road.
Relying on the Colorado case oiLee v. Masner,133 the trial court held that use of the

road by even one homesteader is sufficient to make the road public. Lee, however, is
inconsistent with Utah case authority.
Utah "case law has distinguished between use of a road by owners of adjoining
property and by the general public."134 Homestead squatters, while not yet full owners of
property, nonetheless have possessory rights that distinguish them from the general public.
"[A] party settling upon unsurveyed government land who in good faith complies with the
statutory requirements, is entitled, as against subsequent settlers to pre-empt the land[.]"135
A memorandum decision of this Court confirms that use by a homesteader does not create
a public road:
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425F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005).

132

/</. at 742.
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45 P.3d 794 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).

^Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995).
135

Rio Grande Western Railway Co. v. Telluride Power Transmission Co. ,23 Utah 22,
27, 63 P. 995, 1000(1900).
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Although the section twelve road was used by a family
that homesteaded the property long ago, and the section eighteen
road appeared on various maps, this evidence does not meet the
burden required for creating a public highway, whether as a
"county road" or otherwise.136
Lee also varies from Utah law in its claim that use by one person is sufficient to create
a public road.137 For example, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed that use by "occasional
squirrel hunters, fishermen, and the like" and "intermittent private use of the quarry leases
and their employers, and by an occasional hunter or fisherman" was not sufficient to create
a public road.138 Similarly, faced with evidence that a way of travel had been used by a
nursery company and its customers, the court held: "While we do not attempt to here define
what evidence is necessary to establish a highway by virtue of an acceptance from the public
domain or by dedication from the owner, we agree with the trial court that the evidence of
such limited use for such a small section is not sufficient."139 In contrast, the court affirmed
a public road where "the road was unquestionably used very extensively by the general public
for general purposes," and was used for trailing sheep "not by a few persons, but by many
persons, and it involved more than the mere driving of animals on the road."140 The court
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Koller v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 346, U 6.
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45P.2dat795.

^Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 132, 493 P.2d 639, 641 (1972).
™Oregon S. L. R.R. v. Murray City, 2 Utah 2d 427, 435, 277 P.2d 798, 803 (1954).
m

Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 391, 285 P. 646, 648

(1929).
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further commented that "[i]f the claim rested alone upon the use of the road for sawmill
purposes, or for mining purposes, or for the trailing of sheep, the question would be more
difficult,"141 thus indicating those uses alone would likely not be sufficient.
Other states similarly require that the use be significant. "Nevertheless, the public use
necessary to constitute acceptance of the offer to dedicate under [R.S. 2477] cannot be a use
that is merely occasional and not substantial."142 Casual and desultory use is not sufficient.143
Likewise inadequate is evidence of infrequent and sporadic use by sightseers, hunters, and
trappers of a dead-end road running into wild, unenclosed, or uncultivated land.144 The mere
fact that a road or trail existed and was traveled by an individual "perhaps once a year, twice
a year, three times, not over that; maybe some years not at all" will not create a public road.145
It is therefore clear under Utah law that while the public need not consist of "a great
many persons,"146 the use does need to be by significantly more than one and needs to be
more than infrequent use. The infrequent, occasional use described in this case does not
meet the requirement of continuous public use.

m

Id.

l42

Luchetti v. Bandler, 108 N.M. 682, 684 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).

™Kirk v. Schultz, 63 Idaho 278, 284, 119 P.2d 266, 268 (1941).
l44

Hamerly v. Denton, 359 P.2d 121, 125 (Alaska 1961).
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Moulton v. Irish, 218 P. 1053, 1054 (Mont. 1923).
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Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, \ 10, 179 P.3d 768, 773.
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D.

The Evidence Did Not Establish Continuous Public Use of the East Fork Road.
While Haynes do not agree with the trial court's decision about the Bench Road,

Haynes must acknowledge there is some evidence that members of the public used that road.
The sufficiency of that evidence is addressed below. With respect to the East Fork Road,
however, there is really no competent evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, of
public use for the requisite ten continuous years, prior to 1896 or at any time thereafter.
The evidence of use on the East Fork Road is marshaled as follows:
Exhibit 105, the field notes of an 1893 survey, notes a corral at point D.147 The survey
notes also indicate a wagon road and old sawmill site at point A.148
Exhibit 112, an 1894 map, has a reference to an old sawmill at point A, and a corral
at point D.149 The map also shows a road that forks off the Bench Road and continues to
almost the middle of section 8.
Exhibit 121 is a homestead application filed by George Huff in 1895. The homestead
is at point B.150 The application states Huff built a house in December 1893, and established
residence in November 1894. The affidavit accompanying the application states Huff resided

Transcript vol. I, 61.
'Transcript vol. I, 64.
'Transcript vol. I, 70.
'Transcript vol. I, 83.
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there continuously until at least January 12,1901 except for a four month absence in 1987.151
A patent was issued in June 1901.152
Exhibit 122 is the homestead application filed by Charles Saxton. The homestead is
at point C.153 The application states Saxton settled on the homestead in July 1896 and resided
there with only a few absences until January 1903,154 and a patent was issued in October
1903.155
Exhibit 130 is a record of a claim of water diversion, showing George Huff diverted
water for a ditch in 1893.156
The minutes of the Summit County commissioners for September 2, 1947, state that
the fish and game warden "asked that an investigation be made as to the status of the Road
through Howard Haynes Property, and leading to Blue Lake, as Mr. Haynes had closed the
road to the public and the same had been used generally by the public for a long time."157
The minutes state the matter will be taken up with the county attorney, but there is no
indication an investigation occurred or what the result might have been of any
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Exhibit 121, control number JC 2347.
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Id., control number JC 2351.
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Transcript vol. I, 84.
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Exhibit 122, control number JC 2327.
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Id. control number JC 2333.
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Transcript vol. I, 90.
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Exhibit 133; transcript vol. I, 92.
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investigation.158 More critically, there is no evidence that the road at issue was the East Fork
Road - the trial court here found that there was no public portion of the road leading to Blue
Lake.159
This evidence, at best, shows there was once a sawmill, but gives no indication of the
years of use or even who used it. It also shows homesteaders present, but they were not
members of the public as explained above. There was a corral, but no evidence of when or
by whom it was used. There was a road, but no evidence of who used it or when. The
evidence was not clear and convincing of continuous use by the public for any ten year
period. This Court should reverse the trial court's decision that a portion of the East Fork
Road is a public road.
E.

Use of Wild, Uncultivated, and Unenclosed Land Is Presumed Permissive.
Haynes acknowledges there is some evidence that members ofthe public traveled over

the Bench Road and across the Jacobs property en route to Boyer Lake (known then as one
of the Blue Lakes), but assert that such use should be considered permissive and not of the
character that results in a permanent right for all members of the public to use the road. In
the late 1800's time period addressed by much of the evidence, half of the land at issue (all
odd-numbered sections) was owned by the railroad and not subject to the RS 2477160
m

Id.

159

R-Haynes 1451-1452 U 29.
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Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 codified).at 43 U.S.C. § 932,
repealed by Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), Pub.L. No. 94-579 §
706(a), 90 Stat. 2743 (commonly called R.S. 2477).
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statutory invitation to create a public road. For such land, permissive use of the land would
not create a public road.161 Cases from several jurisdictions establish that "there is no
presumption of adversity where the land over which an easement is sought is wild,
uncultivated or unenclosed because of the theory of neighborly accommodation and problems
of notice."162
A recent Maine decision acknowledged a general rule that open and continuous use
of a way is presumed to be adverse, but then stated: "However, application of such a
presumption to a public, prescriptive easement claim for recreational uses is inappropriate
when that claim applies to open fields or woodlands and the ways traversing them."163
Utah law is consistent with this principle. In an early decision the court stated:
But if the land of which that covered by the road is a part is
uninclosed, and not appropriated to any special use by the
owner, the fact that the public travels over it occasionally, as the
custom may be to cross vacant and unoccupied lands without
obj ection from the owner, does not authorize any inference of an
intention to dedicate.164
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Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12, ^ 19, 179 P.3d 775, 782.
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7 Thompson on Real Property § 60.03(b)(6)(viii) at p. 519 (2nd Thomas ed. 2006).
Accord Weihl v. Wagner, 569 N.E.2d 297, 299 (111 Ct. App. 1991); Corruthers v. King, 363
S.W.2d 413, 414 (Ark. 1963).
l63

Lyons v. Baptist Sch. of Christian Training, 804 A.2d 364, 370 (Me. 2002).
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Wilson v. Hull, 7 Utah 90, 92, 24 P. 799, 800 (Utah 1890).
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Another early case, although addressing an easement by necessity, recognized that the
rules applicable to open land must be different than those governing established
communities:
This community, as disclosed by the evidence, during the years
involved, was in process of settlement, and the whole country
was but recently largely open, and the traveler free to follow
almost any course that promised to bring him most easily to his
journey's end. Here we find wheel tracks in almost any
direction without system, and without regard to section lines or
property rights. When, in a community so situated, the time
arrives for the fencing of fields and the establishing of
permanent roads and rights of way, the strict application of this
rule would, in many cases, produce fantastic results quite
inconsistent with justice.165
This is consistent with the testimony presented in this case. For example, Fern Boyer,
born in 1928 and 80 years old at the time of trial,166 testified: "It was just like wide open
country. There were no gates, no fences. Everyone seemed to enjoy everyone else and do
whatever they wanted."167 The evidence showed a general attitude that the open lands could
be freely traversed without seeking permission. Under these circumstances, it would be
improper to apply any presumption that the use was adverse. If there were any such
presumption, this Court should hold the presumption was rebutted by Boyers' own evidence
that "everyone" freely traversed over property of others without ever seeking permission.
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Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 257, 161 P. 1127, 1133 (1916).
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Transcript vol. 11,415.

l67

Transcript vol. II, 431.
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Because the use was all permissive and not adverse, by permitted the use the owner
(the railroad) did not thereby abandon the road to the public.168
F.

The Evidence Did Not Establish Ten Years Continuous Public Use ofthe Bench Road.
The trial court found there was continuous public use from 1880 to 1896. There was

no specific evidence of use in 1880; the first date after that was 1883, when William Staley
and Leonard Randall settled their homesteads. George Huff settled his homestead in 1895,
and Charles Saxton in 1896. The last of these four to receive a patent was Charles Saxton,
in 1903, twenty years after the first of the group to settle. But, as set forth above,
homesteaders are not members of the public. And, the initial visit by each homesteader to
locate his homestead site is the type of casual, sporadic use that cannot ripen into a public
right of way for all time.
There is evidence that one sawmill operated on the Bench Road, but no evidence of
how long it operated - only a claim that it operated "for many years." The sawmill was
apparently constructed by permission of the county court, so the use was by permission. Use
of the road by the business invitees of the sawmill is likewise permissive and does not count
as use by members of the public.l69 More importantly, evidence that a sawmill existed at one
point on the road is not clear and convincing evidence that the entire road was used - it only
might show use up to the point of the sawmill.

m

Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12, If 19, 179 P.3d 775, 782.

m

See Draper City v. Estate ofBernardo, 888 P.2d 1097,1099 (Utah 1995); Luevano
v. Maestas, 874 P.2d 788, 793 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
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As with sawmills, evidence that John Clark maintained a dipping corral is not
evidence of public use of the roads. There is no evidence that the sheep were driven along
the roads, and even if they were, the use by a business invitee is not use by the public.
There is evidence that sheepmen occasionally went to Upton or to Peter's Park, and
evidence that townspeople occasionally went to the Blue Lakes. There is no evidence,
however, as to exactly when or how often any of this happened. This is not clear and
convincing evidence of continuous public use.
Haynes acknowledged that roads existed on the property. The mere existence of
roads, however, does not give rise to an inference that the roads were used by members of
the public.170 The travelers that created the roads could have been adjoining landowners or
others with documentary or prescriptive rights.171
In addition, as argued above, this Court should hold that all use of the road in this
wild, unenclosed area was presumed permissive. Such a presumption is consistent with the
evidence that everyone freely went wherever they wanted. The law should not presume that
such wanderings create public roads.
This Court should hold that the evidence was not clear and convincing that the
railroad (the owner of half the sections of land during the 1880 to 1896 time frame)
abandoned the road to the public. There was no clear and convincing evidence of continuous

m

Koller v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 346, \ 6 (evidence that a road appeared on various
maps "does not meet the burden required for creating a public highway")m

See Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995).
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public use for any ten year period. This Court should hold that the Bench Road was not a
public road.
CONCLUSION
This Court should hold there was no clear and convincing evidence of ten years
continuous public use of the East Fork Road, and hold that no portion of the East Fork Road
is public. The Court should hold that because the Bench Road was in wide, unenclosed
territory, the use of the road by members of the public was presumed permissive and that use
did not effect a dedication and abandonment of the road to the public.
With respect to any segment of the road ultimately determined to be public, the Court
should hold that the width of the road must be determined by a court; this Court should
reverse the delegation of that decision to the County. The Court should direct the entry of
judgment determining the road width is 18 feet in accordance with the trial court's findings.
Alternatively, if the matter is remanded for further findings, this Court should clarify that the
width should be such as will accommodate the use at the time the road became public and
not for contemplated future uses beyond the historic use.
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PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-7840
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750
Attorneys for Jacob Family Chalk Creek,
LLC; Catherine B. Christensen, L.L.C.;
and Brian Garff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC,
et al.,

)
)
)
)
)
;
)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF
POST-TRIAL BRIEF OF JACOB
FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC,
CATHERINE B. CHRISTENSEN,
L.L.C. AND BRIAN GARFF

;1

[Consolidating Case Nos. 00600299
and 980600244]

1

Defendants.

]

Civil No. 980600244

Judge: Bruce C. Lubeck

JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC,
et al.,
Counterclaim
Plaintiffs,

;
]
)
)

VS.
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HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY, et al.,
Counterclaim Defendants.

TRIPLE H. RANCH, LC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FERN J. BOYER et al.,
Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY, et al.
Third-Party Defendants.

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the POST-TRIAL BRIEF OF JACOB
FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC, CATHERINE B. CHRISTENSEN, L.L.C. AND BRIAN
GARFF was served via hand-delivery on the 11th day of March 2008, to the following:
Ray G. Martineau, Esq.
Anthony R. Martineau, Esq.
Brett D. Cragun, Esq.
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Attorneys for Hayties Land & Livestock
Company, Triple H Ranch, LC, Chalk
Creek-Hoytsville Water Users

Stephen G. Schwendiman, Esq.
Norman K. Johnson, Esq.
Julie I. Valdes, Esq.
Assistant Attorneys General
1594 West North Temple, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
Attorneys for the State of Utah

Brent A. Bohman, Esq.
157 North Commercial Street, Suite 3
P.O. Box 120
Morgan, UT 84050
Attorney for Fern J. Boyer, Gerald G.
Boyer, Gregory J. Boyer, J. S. Hansen, and
Alfred C Blonquist

HOWARD LEWIS & PETERSEN

Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq.
120 East 300 North
Provo,UT 84606
Attorney for Haynes Land & Livestock
Company, Triple H Ranch, LC, Chalk
Creek-Hoytsville Water Users

David L. Thomas, Esq.
Jami R. Brackin, Esq.
60 North Main
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, UT 84017
Attorneys for Summit County
and was served via first class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on the 12th day of March 2008, to the
following:
Timothy W. Blackburn, Esq.
Mara A. Brown, Esq.
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL& MCCARTHY

2404 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,UT 84401
Attorneys for B.A. Bingham & Sons, LLC

Paul R. Poulsen, Esq.
TESCH LAW OFFICES, PC

314 Main Street, No. 200
P.O. Box 3390
Park City, UT 84060
Attorney for David B. Williams
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DATED this 12

day of March 2008.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

Tobi D. Potestio
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

Case No. 980600244

vs.

Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK

JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK,
LIMITED, et.al.

DATE: March 21, 2008

Defendant.
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK,
LIMITED, et.al.
Counterclaim Plaintiffs,

vs.
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY,
Counterclaim Defendants
TRIPLE H RANCH LC,
Plaintiff,

vs.
FERN BOYER, et.al.
Defendants and Third Party
Plaintiffs

,

vs.
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY,
Third Party Defendants.
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The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on
March 4, 5, 6, 7, and 11, 2008.

Haynes, Triple H, and Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users
were present with and through Ray G. Martineau and Leslie Slaugh;
Jacob-Christensen and Garff (Jacob) were present through Clark
Waddoups, Tobi D. Potestio and Jonathan 0. Hafen; the Boyer
parties (Fern Boyer, Gerald Boyer, Gregory Boyer and Alfred
Blonquist, Trustee) were present with and through Brent Bohman;
Summit County was present through Jami R. Brackin; and the State
of Utah was present through Steven G. Schwendiman. Paul R.
Poulsen for David B. Williams gave notice on March 3, 2008, that
Williams would not appear at or participate in the trial.
Timothy W. Blackburn for Bingham and Sons also filed a notice of
non-appearance on March 4, 2008.
A default certificate was entered April 18, 2006, against
Stillman, the Halls, Helen Blonquist and Karel Snyder, who had
written she has no property in Utah.

BACKGROUND
Haynes filed a complaint September 8/ 1998.

It sought

declaratory judgment quieting title in plaintiff to property and
sought an adjudication of the rights and duties between Haynes
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and Jacob.

The original complaint originally named as defendants

Catherine Christensen, LLC and Brian Garff and Summit County.

It

also sought to enjoin defendants from interfering with
plaintiff's property rights.
In briefest summary, it alleged Haynes and Jacob owned
adjoining properties in an area of Summit County known as Chalk
Creek, Jacob's property being west and south of plaintiff's
property.

Historically there has been a limited right of way

across plaintiff's land to Jacob's land solely for agricultural
and livestock purposes.

In May 1984 the parties entered an

agreement which resolved the nature of Jacob's rights concerning
the easement and plaintiff's right to cross Jacob's property to
maintain an irrigation ditch to convey water from Jacob's
property to Haynes' property.

As to Garff, Haynes asserted Garff

had no right to passage over the Haynes property to reach a cabin
or other improvements, nor did Jacob, as such passage was beyond
the quit claim deed and agreement of 1984• As to Summit County,
plaintiff asserts the county improperly designated a private
roadway on Haynes' property as a public road.
Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Haynes owns its property,
has an easement over Jacob's property to service the irrigation
ditch, that the roadway across Haynes' property is not public and
is solely for agricultural purposes and uses by Jacob, and the
court should enjoin Summit County from issuing building permits
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pending the outcome of the case.
On September 28, 1998, Summit County was dismissed by
Haynes.
For reasons not shown by the file no action was taken until
service of process much later and Jacob filed an answer and
counterclaim on May 15, 2003.

It denied the essential

allegations and alleges Garff owns a cabin on the Jacob property
and Garff and Jacob have the right to use a road crossing the
Haynes property.

The road crosses Haynes property from SR 133,

the Chalk Creek Road, and extends southward to Jacob's property
and has been designated since 1978 as a Class D County road. It
is the only feasible means of access to the Jacob property and
has been in use since at least the mid- to late 1800s.
Jacob first seeks a declaration that the road is a Class D
County 'Road and is a public road and Haynes may not deny or
restrict Jacob's use.

Jacob also seeks a declaration that the

road has been in existence since the 1800s, is commonly known as
an RS 2477 road, in reference to an 1866 federal statute,
repealed in 1976. The road was part of the public domain and the
right of use may not be extinguished without proper state
procedures for abandonment of a public road,
Jacob secondly series tfa& alternate declaration the road is a
public right of way.
Third, Jacob seeks a declaration of easement by necessity.
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Jacob alleges that before 1938, the Haynes and Jacob properties
were owned jointly by the Wright Brothers, and that Jacob bought
the property in 1938 and an easement was not expressly reserved
to cross Haynes property.

There is therefore an implied grant of

easement by necessity for access to the Jacob property.
Fourth, Jacob seeks a declaration that an easement was
granted.

This was granted February 3, 1939, and recorded, and it

is subject to reasonable expansion when livestock grazing is not
frequent and Jacob is entitled to enjoy the land for grazing,
hunting, camping, and recreation, including construction of
cabins to facilitate recreational use.
Fifth Jacob alternatively seeks a declaration of
prescriptive easement, that Jacob uses the road to access its
property, that has occurred for more than 20 years, the use has
been open and visible and without permission of Haynes.
Sixth, Jacob alleges trespass, that Haynes has threatened to
restrict Jacob's use and has locked gates.

In 1997 Garff

obtained a building permit to build a cabin on the Jacob
property.

Haynes then sought to restrict further approvals.

Damages have followed because of plaintiff's conduct.
Seventh, Jacob alleges the complaint of plaintiff is in bad
faith.

On June 4, 2003, Haynes replied to the counterclaim.
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On August 27, 2003, Haynes moved to consolidate docket
number 000600299 into this case. That case was entitled Triple H
Ranch LC v Fern J. Boyer, Gerald G. Boyer, Gregory J, Boyer,
Karel J. Snyder, H.S. Hansen, Helen Blonquist, Alfred C.
Blonquist, Barbara Hall and Kevin Hall, defendants and third
party plaintiffs vs. Haynes Land & Livestock, Lydia 0. Stillman
dba Stillman Seven, Jacob Family Chalk Creek, Limited, Catherine
B. Christensen, LLC, B.A. Bingham 6c Sons LLC, Chalk Creek
Hoytsville Water Users Corp, Summit County, and State of Utah
Department of Fire, Forestry and State Lands, third party
defendants.

The court issued a ruling and order September 23,

2003, consolidating the cases as the-motion was4 unopposed. The
court asked that an order be prepared but it was not provided
until April 11, 2005, when it was signed by the court. Based on
stipulation in June 2005 a scheduling order was entered.
That complaint, now consolidated into this case, alleges
Triple H has an undivided 11/36 interest in property between the
Haynes and Jacob properties, Fern Boyer has 3/40, Gerald Boyer
3/40, Gregory Boyer 1/10, Karel Snyder 1/36, J.S. Hansen 1/6,
Helen Blonquist has a claimed interest in the property, Helen
Blonquist as trustee has a 1/6 interest, Alfred Blonquist has an
undivided 1/12 interest, and defendants Barbara and Kevin Hall
may claim an interest in property in this Chalk Creek area in the
west half of the Northeast quarter and the northeast quarter of
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the Northwest quarter of Section 34 Township 2 North Range 8
East, SL Base and Meridian, with exceptions.

The complaint was

under Title 78 Chapter 39 and seeks partition by sale for the
common benefit of all parties who own that property. It further
alleges the property involved consists of 5 non-contiguous
parcels, no party has any easements, partition without sale is
impossible, and plaintiff asks for a decree determining the
respective rights of the parties to the property, that it be sold
subject to exceptions, and that the proceeds be applied to costs
and attorney fees and then distributed according to the interests
of the parties in the property.
An amended answer and counterclaim was filed in July 2005
pursuant to stipulation.

The amended answer and counterclaim

adds as another counterclaim the named defendants in what was
formerly docket no. 000600299.

It contains the same basic causes

of action but alleges against all defendants and seeks
declaratory judgment (1) against all counterclaim defendants that
the road is a public road from the 1800s and Class D county road
since 1978 (2) that the road is an RS 2477 road as against all
counterclaim defendants, (3) that Jacob has a prescriptive
easement against all defendants except Suinftiit County for purposes
of, among other things, livestock grazing, hunting, fishing,
camping, snowmobiling, picnicking, recreational enjoyment, and
the construction and use of cabins, (4) that Jacob has an
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easement by necessity against Haynes and the State because when
the property was sold by Wright in about 1938 Jacob was given no
express easement and Jacob has no other access and Jacob is
landlocked without the easement. A conservation easement was
granted to the State in 1999 on part of Haynes property and that
easement was taken by the State subject to Jacob's right to use
the road, (5) as against Haynes and the State that Jacob has been
granted an express but restricted easement in 1939 to use the
road for moving livestock and related equipment and the express
easement is subject to reasonable expansion to accommodate
reasonable use and enjoyment of the benefitted land as noted in
the third cause of action above, and (6) trespass as against
Haynes in that Jacob owns an interest in the land and Haynes is
threatening and attempting to block access and is thus
trespassing and Jacob and Garff have been damaged in an amount to
be proven, and (7) Haynes is acting in bad faith by bringing its
complaint and Jacob has had to defend against a frivolous suit.

On August 1, 2005, Bingham, one of the consolidated third
party defendants filed an answer.

On August 4, 2005/ Summit County filed an answer to the
counterclaim.
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Williams filed an answer August 15, 2005, as well as a cross
claim,

Jacob answered November 9, 2005.

The State filed an answer August 30, 2005, and Chalk CreekHoytsville Water Users filed an answer on September 15, 2005.

Other defendants filed various answers, some indicating no
interest in the lawsuit. Hall filed a disclaimer April 6, 2006.

Jacob filed a motion for partial summary judgment on
September 8, 2006, as the next pleading.

The court heard

arguments on that matter on March 19, 2007, after extensions were
granted for delayed briefing, and issued a Ruling and Order
denying the motion on the public road issue on March 29, 2007.

Since that time various discovery disputes have arisen and
this trial date was scheduled.

On October 3, 2007, the undersigned judge and court staff
accompanied counsel and various others on a day-long journey to
the property at issue, crossing the Haynes and Jacob properties
whil^ ^Otmaeland pthers pointed out various sites*

That Afield

trip" was not on the record though the court's clerk was present
and made some minutes which are part of the file. The court, for
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its own information and memory, took some photographs which it
retains as an aid to recollection of the area. Those are not part
of the record though numerous photographs taken by the parties
were introduced and received at trial.

On January 15, 2008, the parties stipulated that the trial
would proceed on the issues dealing with the parties' rights to
use of the roadways, and to defer trial of any other issues
dealing with partition of the Boyer property until after this
trial.

On January 25, 2008, the court signed an order based on
stipulation of the parties that Jacob Family Chalk Creek LLC be
substituted as defendant, counterclaim plaintiff, and third party
defendant in place of the previously named limited partnership.

The court on January 30, 2008, denied the request of Haynes
and the State to postpone the trial awaiting Utah Supreme Court
rulings.

In fact the Utah Supreme Court issued the anticipated

rulings dealing with public roads on February 12, 2008.

The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument
<
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of counsel, received pre-trial briefs, visited the site, received
post-trial briefs, and is fully advised- The court took the
matter under advisement.

It does not appear as if the facts are in great dispute, but
the legal consequences of those facts is where this dispute is
centered.

The court finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The nature of the parties appears, without serious
dispute, to be as follows.
2. Plaintiffs are Haynes Land and Livestock, Triple H Ranch
LC, and Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users.

Haynes is a general

partnership and owns property in Summit County.

All property at

issue is located in TIN R8E, T2N R8E, T2N R7E and T3N R7E, as
described in Exhibit AA attached to Haynes Trial Brief.

The

Haynes property comprises just under 10,000 acres.
Triple H is a limited liability company and it owns an
undivided one third interest in the Boyer-Triple H property
(Boyer property)in T2 R8 Section 34.

Water Users is a

corporation and it owns property also in Section 34.
Jacob Family Chalk Creek LLC is a limited liability company
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and Catherine B. Christensen LLC is as well, and each owns an
undivided one half interest in the approximately 10,000 acres as
fully described in Exhibit DD to plaintiffs' trial brief, land
mostly to the west and south of the Haynes property. Throughout
this decision the court will normally call the Jacot-Christensen
entities "Jacob." That is not done to imply Jacob is more
important than Christensen, but is simply shorter than writing
Jacob-Christensen so frequently.

On occasion, such as describing

cabins, the court will use the Jacob cabin, or the Christensen
cabin and so forth. Whenever "Jacob" is used, unless the context
shows otherwise, the court is referring to the Jacob-Christensen
entities and families.
Garff is a family member of the Jacob entities who has
attempted to build a cabin on the Jacob property.
Bingham & Sons owns property between SR 133 and the Haynes
property.

Stillman owns property nearby.

Fern Boyer, Gerald

Boyer, Gregory Boyer, J.S. Hansen, and Alfred Blonquist own an
undivided 2/3 interest in combination with Triple H of what is
called the Boyer property in Section 34 T2 R8.
Summit Count claims an interest in the Class D road and the
State of Utah claims a grantee's right in the conservation
easements involved or to be involved.
3. This dispute concerns historic routes to travel across
property owned by Haynes and whether that travel is over a public
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road, whether that travel is permissible and governed by some
form of easement, or whether access across Haynes' property is
more limited.

Other subsidiary issues abound concerning use by

others as well.
4. All references are to the Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
and this land involves three townships, TIN, T2N or T3N, and
Ranges 7E or 8E.

Throughout, these will be short handed to Tl,

T2, or T3, R7 or R8 together with the appropriate section number.
From Coalville, Utah, the county seat of Summit County,
heading basically eastward is SR 133, commonly called the Chalk
Creek Road. That road travels easterly and eventually leads, over
unimproved roads east of the area of concern in this case, to
Wyoming and other areas of Utah. Leaving SR 133 approximately 18
miles east of Coalville in a south easterly direction, Haynes and
Jacob each own substantial property (approximately 10,000 acres
each).

The chain of titles will be discussed but in essence

Haynes bought property closest to SR 133 in the 1930s and 1940s.
Further removed from SR 133 Jacob also owns substantial property,
and the Boyer parties own property consisting of substantially
smaller acreage in a Section bounded by the Haynes property and
the Jacob property.

To get to their property Jacob has to cross

the Haynes property, as do the Boyers to get to their property*
Now disputes have arisen about the nature of that use and whether
the routes traveled to gain access is a public road or whether
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Haynes ownership of the property is subject to certain types of
easements in favor of Jacob or Boyer. Up to the day of trial
there evidently was an issue as to whether any access was allowed
by Boyer and it is Haynes position still at trial Boyer has no
easement to gain access to the Boyer property.
5. From SR 133 a road crosses property owned by Bingham.
That road goes for approximately one quarter mile and then leads
onto the Haynes property as shown on X117 on T3 R7 Sec. 35.
Interestingly, all involved including Haynes have used this road
and Bingham, the owner, evidently has never attempted to stop
such use from SR 133 and Bingham did not participate in this
trial. All involved have evidently treated this first quarter
mile or so as always being open to the public.

The road shown on

that map X117 shows where the current course of that road in
orange.

The road at that point is commonly called the Bench Road

or historically Sage Brush Flats, and it travels onto Haynes
property in T3 R7 Section 35. There is now a locked gate and
fence with several signs basically stating No Trespassing or
Private Property. That gate is in Section 35 as above. The
particulars of the beginnings of those signs and gate are in some
dispute. The road at issue then travels further onto and through
Hayings property easterly onto T3 R7 Section 3$, then turns
southerly onto T2 R8 Section 1.

It splits in T2 R8 Section 7,

and the "main" or Bench Road at issue goes southerly still across
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Haynes property through T2 R8 Sections 7 and 18 until the Jacob
property begins at T2 R8 Section 19 immediately south of Section
18.

At that point the road has commonly (and will be herein)

called the Middle Fork Road.

The land becomes more mountainous

and less level. Thus, at T2 R8 the property line between Haynes
and Jacob is the section line between Sections 18 and 19.

The

Middle Fork Road continues south easterly on Jacob's property
through T2 R8 Sections 19, 20, 29, 32, 33 and into Tl R8 Section
4, which is toward the south end of the Jacob property.

At

approximately that area Jacob and Christensen have built some
cabins to be discussed below.

The road then travels north

easterly back through T2 R8 Section 33 and onto T2 R8 Section 34
where lakes are located as discussed in the next paragraph.

The

Boyer property at issues is all within T2 R8 Section 34, bounded
on the north, south and west by Jacob property and on the north
and east by the Haynes property.
6* At the split in T2 R8 Section 7 back to the north what is
called the East Fork Road (or East Fork Loop) travels easterly
and somewhat southerly, across T2 R8 Sections 8, 9, and 15 and
then turns south and crosses T2 R8 Sections 22, 23, 26 and 27,
all still on Haynes property, where it veers a bit west onto the
Jacob property at T2 R8 Section 27, just north of and near what
are called Joyce Lake and Boyer Lake or Boyer Reservoir located
within T2 R8 Section 34.

The road from the East Fork then
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continues southerly across the Boyer property in T2 R8 Section
34, crosses the reservoir and travels south westerly onto the
Jacob property.

Thus, considering the Middle Fork Road until it

reaches the Boyer property, and the East Fork Road until it
reaches the Boyer property, the named aspects of this road "meet"
and a loop is formed.

The entire road has in the past been

called the East Fork of Chalk Creek, as it is in the East Fork
Chalk Creek drainage, but the terminology used in this paragraph
will be used throughout this Memorandum Decision to mean the
Bench Road on the Haynes property from the northern beginning
point in T3 R7 Section 35 until the property line between Haynes
and Jacob at T2 R8 Sections 18 and 19. Thereafter the road will
be called the Middle Fork from T2 R8 Section 19 all through the
Jacob property until it reaches the Boyer property on T2 R8
Section 34. On the Boyer property the road will be called the
Boyer road.

Continuing from there at the north end of the Boyer

property in Section 34 T2 R8 on the Haynes property the road will
be called the East Fork Road until it "rejoins" the Bench Road in
T2 R8 Section 7.
7. There is another road, which the court will call the West
Fork Road, about which there seems little dispute.

It leaves the

Bench Road on Haynes property in T2 R8 Section 18 and branches
off to the west and mostly south, onto Jacob property at T2 R8
Section 19 and then remains on the Jacob property to the southern
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border of Jacob's property at Tl R7 Section 12.
8. The issues in this case concern the entire loop.

Jacob

and Boyers and Summit County contend the entire loop is a public
road, including the Bench Road, Middle Fork Road, Boyer Road, and
East Fork Road.

Haynes and the State of Utah assert none of it

is a public road but there is a prescriptive easement in favor of
Jacob but none in favor of Boyer.
9. At the beginning of trial plaintiffs conceded for the
first time in an oral stipulation that Jacob .could have an
agricultural and recreational easement over Haynes' property
along the Bench Road and East Fork Road consistent with the
historical use including oil and gas exploration but that use
does not include use for the fourth, or Garff, cabin erected on
the Jacob property, to be discussed below. Jacob accepted the
stipulation but of course urged it does not go far enough and
Jacob has additional rights of use and Jacob claims the entire
road is public.
10. Most of this land was once owned by the Wright Brothers
who conveyed various portions at various times to both Haynes and
the predecessors of Jacob.

In the mid 1930s various parcels were

conveyed as shown on X3Q0.

The portions conveyed to Wasatch"

Livestock later basically became the Jacob property.
11. In 1932 Haynes, through Howard Hayes Sr, acquired the
northern half of Section 36, T3 R7, as well as T2 R8 Sections 9,
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15, 22, 23, 26, 35 as well as the eastern half of Section 27,
some of Section 34 except the Boyer property, and the eastern
half of Section 3 Tl R8. Thus, Haynes bought in 1932 what is the
northern portion of its current property, approximately 6200
acres more or less.

Thus, the Bench Road crossed Haynes property

only on Section 36 of T3 R7. The remainder of the Bench Road,
Section 35 of T3 R7, T2 R7 Section 1, T2 R8 Sections 7 and 18,
went across land owned by others, not Haynes, until Haynes bought
those portions, along with the southern half of Section 8 T2 R8
in about 1941. Specifically, as shown on X204, Haynes bought the
south half of Section 36 T3 R7 and T2 R7 Section 1 in 1940 and
Sections 7, 17, and 18 and most of Section 8 T2 R8 in 1941.
12. Triple H and the Boyers own undivided interests in
Section 34 T2 R8. The land surrounds the Boyer Reservoir in
Section 34 T2 R8. X116 shows the non-contiguous nature of the
Boyer property within Section 34 T2 R8. The property basically
surrounds the Boyer Reservoir owned and operated by the Chalk
Creek-Hoytsville Water Users. The Boyers owned the land on which
the Boyer Reservoir sits in Section 34 T2 R8, and it was formerly
the Boyer Lake, one. >of three lakes comprising the Blue Lakes.
The Boyers in 1903 filed a notice of appropriation for storage of
water in a reservoir. The Boyer family received patent in 1914 to
the Boyer property at issue and conveyed some of it to the Chalk
Creek Reservoir Company for purposes of the reservoir. That
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entity conveyed approximately 83 acres to the Chalk CreekHoytsville Water Users. Ax right of way was acquired in 1934 from
the Wright Brothers. X6. After conveying the reservoir land to
what is now known as the Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users,
Boyers retained the land around the Boyer Reservoir as shown on
X116.

Triple H was formed in 2000 to purchase some of that land

and now owns an approximate 1/3 undivided interest in what is
called herein the Boyer property in Section 34.
13. Haynes thus owns the land over which the Bench Road and
the East Fork Road travel, and Haynes claims there are only three
exceptions to Haynes record title: (1) the stipulated
prescriptive easement in favor of Jaoob, (2) the easement created
by the deeds, X6-X9, for limited livestock usage, and (3) an
easement for the Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users (Water Users)
to construct and maintain the reservoir/ Boyer Reservoir.
14. Jacob bought its property, which again is to the south
and west of Haynes property, from Wasatch Livestock, which was
run by Irv Jacob.

The Jacob property is again owned by the LLC

and the Christensen LLC as equal undivided interest owners. It
was purchased in the name of Jacob and Christensen in October
1938.

15. Once adquired the properties tretg bjasiealiy- v&n and
managed by the parents of the current disputants.

Howard Haynes

Sr ran the Haynes property and his son and sibling Shirley
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MacFarlane now basically operate the Haynes Land and Livestock
LLC. Joe Jacob, the son of Irv Jacob, basically ran and operated,
along with his siblings, the Jacob property during the time
Howard Haynes, Sr, operated the Haynes property.

Howard Haynes

Sr. died in 1979. The testimony did not show when Joe Jacob
died. The issues have arisen, as is always the case, in more
recent times now that the "original" owners are not involved.
16. For the basically 40 years Haynes Sr operated the ranch
sheep and cattle grazed the area, some belonging to Haynes, some
under lease, and various wildlife operations were allowed to use
the property under contract as well.

Beginning in about 1978

Haynes allowed his property to be used as what was called a
Posted Hunting Units. Various "outfitters" or companies would
lease the land and charge customers to buy permits to hunt for a
fee.

Those people who hunted under the PHU, which later became

Cooperative Wildlife Management Units, or CWMUs, were allowed on
the property since 1978 until the present, on the Haynes
property, to hunt deer, elk and other wildlife.

Those lessees

guarded the gates and checked during hunting season (basically
August through October), as best they could, to determine that
those on the Haynes land had permits. Some people, those who drew
public permits, were guided. During that time frame perhaps 100
people a year counting guests used the property of Haynes. There
were permits for on average 40-50 animals per year, and two could
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go in the hunting party and others could stay in the campgrounds.
They could bring RVs, ATVs, tents, campers, horses, and so forth.
Most of the property is not fences though some is.

Haynes has

several "cross fences" on its property and some gates protected
by "cattle guards."

There is a fence between some of the Haynes

and Jacob property at Sections 18-19 as discussed herein.
17. Jacob has also leased its lands, or portions thereof,
for various others to run sheep and other livestock, as well as
their own sheep and livestock in the past.
cabins on their property as well.

Jacob has built

These uses will be discussed

further below.
18. The court intends to find facts chronologically to
explain its conclusions. To begin much before this litigation
before statehood in 1896 all of these lands belonged to the
United States and were part of the public domain. The "land use
policy" of the United States was that the lands could be used by
about anyone for about any purposes without permits, permission,
or concern for the finite nature of resources.

People could

timber and vhunt and graze livestock without regard to about
anything.

The even numbered sections were public land and the

odd sections were public land until 1869 when they were acquired
by the railroads.

According to the title examination, X35, title

to almost all of these relevant sections in this area vested in
the State of Utah upon achieving statehood in 1896, and various
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patents were granted to railroads as well and some lots were
selected by Utah for various purposes such as a reform school, a
permanent reservoir, and other purposes.

There was no evidence

that the railroad ever did anything with any of the sections
involved in this area and the ownership of the railroads ceased
just after 1900.
19. Jacob claims the historical evidence shows the entire
road, the entire loop involved is a public road under law and
Haynes asserts it is not.

Many historical documents, all hearsay

but admissible under varying exceptions, were received and have
been reviewed.
20.

Many historical documents were received, plaintiffs

having stipulated they were admissible as far as being authentic
and being exceptions to the hearsay rule.

Plaintiffs objected as

they were not relevant given that they could not produce
sufficient proof by the necessary quantum of proof that this road
was a public road.

The court allowed admission of the documents

and will briefly summarize as part of its findings those most
heavily relied on by Jacob.
21. A probate court entry from March of 1862 shows someone
requested permission to take timber out of "East Kanyon" and to
make a i^oad.

The court finds this is not convincing that this

was in the drainage area of the East Fork of Chalk Creek but it
does show that the public was, at that time, enabled to obtain
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timber at will from the public lands.
22.

In 1865 a probate court docket minute entry shows

approval was given for persons to take timber from Chalk Creek
and have a saw mill. Again that does not demonstrate to this
court by clear and convincing evidence this road at issue was
involved as Chalk Creek could be any of the many miles now called
Chalk Creek.

It again shows some evidence, however, that the

public was using the public lands.

That court entry showed L.L.

Randall and Jacob Huffman wanted a saw mill and those names will
be found later herein. A 1947 historical text, X137, shows at
page 139 that L.L. Randall had one of the first saw mills two
miles from Pine Cliff, and that is in this area. Pine Cliff is
along SR 133 just east and north of where this Bench Road leaves
SR 133. Randall's homestead, discussed later, was along Bench
Road in T2 R8 Section 18.

X158 confirms Huffman operated a saw

mill on the East Fork.
23. Court minute entries from December 1866 and 1867 show
two other requests in "Echo Kanyon" and Cache Cove for a "herd
ground." This is not convincing to the court as being in this
immediate area though it again shows the public nature of the
public lands and general area.
24. Official government surveys from the time are convincing
to the court.

X109 shows quite clearly the area of T3 R7 Section

35, where the current Bench Road leaves SR 133 going southward.
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Other maps and notes from this 1874 survey (the survey was in
1873 and the resulting map from 1874, so those dates are largely
interchangeable), combined with the stipulated expert report of
Matthew Liapis, X296, show that there was a road in 1874 along
what is now called the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road.
25. In summary, that expert report shows Liapis attempted to
determine if the 1873 and 1893 surveys described herein
correspond to the current road at issue. He used the survey maps
from 1874 and 1894. He consulted other experts, he toured the
area and used other filed survey notes. He concluded the maps
from the 1800s show the road then was substantially similar to
the current Bench Road and Middle Fork Road with some fairly
minor variations.

He noted the surveyors in that time often did

not venture into the interior of a section but only noted the
roads along the section boundaries and basically "filled in" the
area where the road probably went in the interior of a section.
26. The survey notes from 1873 (the 1874 survey map) show a
saw mill along the East Fork, T2 R8 Section 7, shown on X117 at
Point A.
27. A probate court minute entry of 1869 shows U.S.
Surveyors were in Chalk Creek and th£ court asked a group of men
to assist. X242.
28. A territorial map from 1874 and 1875 shows a *saw mill"
in this rough vicinity of these properties but it is impossible
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to tell from that map precisely where the noted saw mill was
located.

XI63, XI64.

29. In a court minute entry of 1879 L.L. Randall and others
sought permission to divert water in Chalk Creek. X. 234.
30. L.W. Randall applied for a homestead in 18 96, indicating
he had been living there since 1885, and he had improved the
property and was he given a patent in 1903. X. 120. That is shown
on Point F in X117 in Section 18 near the Bench Road.
31 . In 1895 W.H. Staley applied for a homestead in Section
18 T2 R8, indicating he had resided there since 1883, and he made
improvements and irrigated and built corrals and such and he was
given a patent in 1901.1 That is shown as being near the Bench
Road on X117 at Point E in Section 18 T2 R8.
32. A U.S. Survey Sectional and Mineral map of 1875 shows a
cabin where Point K on X117 is shown, near the current Middle
Fork Road on the southern end of the Jacob property.
33. In 1895 George Huff applied for a homestead, indicating

*While these accounts of this time and place fascinate most
and may cause many to wish for those "good old days'' when a
person could begin living in an area and create a homestead
there obviously was a down side. A newspaper article from July
1886 demonstrates that perhaps those days, while they had their
glory and glamor, were not all so good. William Staley,
according to the report, in the course of 10 days lost two sons
and a daughter to XAthat dreadful disease diphtheria," The article
states "The unfortunate family a short time ago had a new home
burnt to the ground. Their lot seems more than human nature can
bear.'' William Staley's brother, M.H. Staley a few days later
lost two children, ages 3 and 5, to the disease. All 5 deaths
were within the space of two weeks.
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he had been living there since 1894, and he was granted a patent
in 1901. X, 121. That was in Section 8 T2 R8, at Point B on X117.
34. A court minute entry of 1894 indicated the prosecuting
attorney should prosecute anyone who has been blocking public
highways in any of the canyons in Summit County which have been
used for 7 years.

This does not directly relate to this area but

again shows the public nature of the canyons to some extent.
35. A Coalville Times newspaper article from August 1895
indicated that about 40,000 sheep had been "dipped" and about
100,000 were expected at Clark's corral.

These numbers were to

some extent corroborated by X401-405, which showed at Coalville
(the county seat) the tax records for 1993 show some 200,000
sheep were taxed as having been brought into Summit County for
summer grazing.

This is some corroboration that a large number

of sheep were in the area but does not show the number of sheep
specifically in Chalk Creek. Another article from the next year,
1896, also indicated 100,000 sheep were dipped at Clark's.
Clark's dipping corral was in T2 R8 Section 19, now on the Jacob
property, very near the Middle Fork Road shown on X117 at J.
Dipping of sheep occurred by having the sheep in essence "bathed"
in a chemical, creosote, to keep the flies off them.
36. Charles Saxton applied for a homestead in Section 8 Ts
R8 indicating he had moved there in 1896.
patent.

He was later given a

X. 122. That is in Section 8 T2 R8 south of the current
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East Fork Road.
38. Various news articles from the late 1890s show various
people had killed bear in the East Fork of Chalk Creek (this
entire area) but none show the specific use of any particular
roads.

Those articles show use by persons in the area on public

lands but are not convincing that any particular road was used.
39. A USGS survey map of 1903 shows the Bench Road and the
Middle Fork Road to an area which appears to the court to be Tl
R8 Section 4 and possibly into T2 R8 Section 33, north and west
of the Boyer Reservoir. It also shows the East Fork Road
terminating in the middle of Section 8 of T2 R8. The roads as
shown on that map are reflected in X296, Attachment H.

The court

finds that map particularly compelling.
40. In 1902 William Boyer, according to a public record
(X123) applied to divert water from what appears to^ be the
current dam at Boyer Reservoir, then called Boyer Lake, in the
north east quarter of the north west quarter of Section 34 T2 R8,
the site of the Boyer property and current Boyer Reservoir.
41. In 1913 a record from the Summit County Commission shows
that on November 5, 1913, the commission authorized the
expenditure of county funds for improvement of the Sage Brush
Flat road in Chalk Creek. Again, as fcund,y Sage Brush Flats was
the name of part of the area the court now calls Bench Road. The
court finds this evidence refers to the B^nch Road area. X244.
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43. A Summit County map from the county surveyor in 1918,
without a legend, seems to show a dotted line on, as best the
court can determine, the rough area of Bench Road and the Middle
Fork Road, again appearing to terminate at the south end of the
Jacob property in Section 4 of Tl R8. The East Fork Road appears
also to be depicted, again terminating in about the middle of
Section 8 T2 R8. X. 166.
44. In a Utah Historical Society paper written in 1983 on
the life of Lady Homesteader Myrtle Rigby it was described how
she settled in the Chalk Creek area and in the summers frequent
city visitors arrived, teams and horses prepared, and everyone
was off to Blue Lake or Bear River to fish.

This is again not

specific as to any particular route or road but it does show use
of the public of this area on public land. X160
45. A 1925 U.S. Forest Service map, X167, is claimed by
Jacob to show the road.

The court cannot decipher the map

provided and cannot find the road referenced.
46. X168, a U.S. Forest Service map of 1929 appears to show
a trail, depicted on the legend as lower than a good or poor
motor road and lower than a "Road Not Passable by Motor" roughly
in the area of what appears to the court to be the Bench Road and
the Middle Fork Road.

It appears to Show the entire loop, but it

shows no lakes and does not appear to the court to be the same as
the other maps showing the East Fork Road. A map from 1931, X169,
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appears to show the same thing* A 1935 Forest Service map appears
to show the same thing, X170. In 1942 a similar map shows the
same loop road but it is on the legend as a "poor" motor vehicle
road, X171.
47. In a Summit County Commission meeting of September 1947
(X 133) a Fish and Game Warden named Ira Page appeared and made a
statement that Haynes had closed the road to Blue Lake and that
road had been used by the public for a long time and the matter
was referred to the County Attorney.
48. At various times earlier various news articles and
journal entries showed people were in this vicinity engaged in
various activities. The court will not identify each date
involved but in summary they showed as follows.

Sheep herders

from the hills came to dances at Upton, on SR 133 a few miles
from the entry point to the Bench Road off SR 133, but there is
no indication as to how those people traveled to get to Upton or
precisely where they came from, but the court finds there is some
inference they went on a road rather than through the deep forest
or over cliffs or across creeks or streams. Sawmills were clearly
present in the area in 1881. A man was lost in 1890 in the East
Fork coinage area and a search posse was $ent for him, but there
is no indication of precisely where nor yhattroutes wese used^ In
1881 a news paper article showed a per$oh from Upton was killed
in a wagon accident 13 miles south east of Upton, which would be
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in this area, after visiting a saw mill in the area.

This shows

persons from Upton visited this East Fork area. X145.
49, Numerous people testified at trial about their comings
and goings after these parties acquired their properties in the
1930s and early 1940s. While the court was aware of the objection
of Haynes the court allowed the testimony over the relevance
objection of Haynes, indicating it would hear the evidence and
determine if it was relevant. It was necessary for the court to
hear the evidence as a whole before the court could determine if
it was persuasive.

The testimony was all relevant as it tended

to prove an issue in the case, namely, who had used this road and
under what conditions.
50. William L. Christensen is the a grandson of A.E.
Christensen, the grantee from Wasatch Livestock of what is now
the Jacob property.

He began going to this area and the Jacob

property in the late 1930s as a young man, having been born in
1932.

He went with his father.

After leaving the county road,

SR 133, Chalk Creek Road, they would take a road and travel it
until they came to the Jacob property. The court finds that was
along the Bench Road. He saw no gates, locked or unlocked after
leaving the highway.

He did recall seeing a sawmill on the Jacob

property about 1940.

After his father died in 1945 he did not go

to the property until the 1960s, after serving in the military
and after being married and having children.

A cabin had been
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built by the Jacob family, as distinguished from the Christensen
family, in about 1948 and he went regularly to use that cabin and
enjoy the property.

He began to see gates on the Haynes property

in the 1960s. There were signs put up by Joe Jacob on the HaynesJacob property line (between Sections 18-19of T2 R8) and he
recalls -them in the 1960s.

He participated in the planning of

what is called the Christensen cabin in the early 1970s and there
were no restrictions on travel or construction equipment along
the Bench Road or Middle Fork Road.

He is familiar with Jacob

having commissioned an oil and gas exploration and the big trucks
that used the area and the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road for
that purpose without difficulty. He participated in a meeting in
1984 when Haynes, through Howard Haynes Jr., began to be upset
about usage of the road.

From that X255 was created, an

agreement about use of the road, the so-called 1984 Agreement.
The cabins built by Jacob and later the Christensens are located
at approximately Point K on X117 in Section 4 Tl R8„ He saw signs
periodically in various places concerning trespassing and such
but paid them no mind as he and his family always believed they
had full access to the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road.

On one

occasion in the 1960s Howard Haynes Sr was stationed by the fence
then existing off SR 133 and he allowed Christensen to pass after
Christensen presented a note from Joe Jacob explaining who he,
William Christensen, was. The 1960s is also the first time he
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recalls seeing a fence between the Haynes-Jacob properties on
sections 18-19 T2 R8. He recalls the road being narrow from the
1930s and early 1940s, with ruts if the weather was bad, and that
was so until perhaps the 1970s. He felt there was no limitation
on the use of the road and that it was always a public road.

At

some point there was a gate and locks and Joe Jacob gave
Christensen either a key or a combination to enter onto the
Haynes property off SR 133. He assumed it was a public road until
the 1960s when it became private.

He never kept the Boyers off

the Jacob property.
51.

William E. Christensen, son of William L. Christensen,

testified the family wants to be free to develop the property as
the Summit County zoning ordinances will allow, but the
Christensens do not plan on having a big development but want to
build other family cabins on their land.

He has often hunted,

fished, and otherwise recreated, at various times, and has taken
many guests and others have been along, including television
media trucks to film hunts and fishing activities on the Jacob
property.
graded.

No gates were locked before 1984.

The road was often

He has had as many as 400 guests on the Jacob property

and he nor those guests were never stopped. The Christensen
family wants a conservation easement and full access may be more
attractive economically if they are compensated for it.

Travel

was by the East Fork Road and Bench Road to the cabin areas.
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Gary and Greg Boyer, brothers, own an interest in the

Boyer property, and Gary Boyer has studied the road issue by
examining historic documents for several hundreds of hours. He is
the son of Fay and Fern Boyer. The Boyers first bought land in
the area in 1905 and received patent in about 1913.

Gary has

been going to the area since he was a young man in the late
1950s, and since then he has been hundreds of times.

The Boyers

usually went on the East Fork Road, and Howard Haynes Sr. had
left a key under a rock so they could have access.

There was

another gate on the East Fork Road, just east of the split in the
loop, on Haynes property in Section 7 T2 R8. Until the 1980s the
main gate off SR 133 was not locked. There was a gate but it was
open.

The East Fork Road gate was first locked in the mid 1970s.

Gary has never been turned away, and he has taken groups of
people and none has ever been stopped from using the East Fork
Road.

Gary Boyer felt Haynes was attempting to block entry so he

began a study of the area.
was always public.

He has believed the Middle Fork Road

The Boyers would also like to build a cabin

on their property. Many, many photographs were received, X269293, X307, portions of X51, and others, each consisting of
multiple photos of various areas and portions of the road and
signs from the early 1970s until the present.

They show many of

the beauties of the area, as well as portions of the road. As
noted herein there are several photos from much earlier.
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53. In the late 1940s the Jacob family built a cabin, in the
area in Section 4 Tl R8, near the south end of their property,
west and south of Boyer Lake.
mid 1950s in the same area.

They built a second cabin in the
Zoning ordinances then were not what

they are now and almost no approval was needed and no inspections
occurred by county officials.

The Christensen family completed a

much larger cabin in the same vicinity in about 1974. Sometime in
the mid 1990s Garff began to build a cabin, what is called the
fourth or Garff cabin.

Garff evidently married a daughter of Joe

Jacob, though the court may be incorrect, but in any event Garff
is now a member of the Jacob family.

He obtained building

permits from Summit County and began building a large, 4500
square foot retreat/residence on the Jacob property not far from
the older Jacob cabins.

That event was evidently the impetus for

ths lawsuit which was filed in 1998.

That Garff cabin evidently

remains unfinished and little or no evidence was presented
respecting this building.

The court did observe it from a

distance on the October 2007 field trip but paid little attention
to its level of completion and the court is unaware as to the
status of the interior of the facility.
53. Charles Herman married i&to the Chr.i3tensen family*

He

first went to the ^acefe property 3$* 19€5, and h^ drove the roads
in a passenger vehicle. He has been there often and frequently
uses the property.

He was basically in charge of building the
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Christensen cabin, near point K on X117, in the early 1970s.

It

is approximately 5000 square feet, with 6 bedrooms and many, many
bunk beds, and it is designed as a family retreat-

It was built

in the Summer months of 1972-1974, by using a crew of 5.

It

involved the normal construction equipment, including a large
crane, cement trucks, 10 wheel dump trucks, front end loaders and
heavy excavation equipment.

He does not recall ever being asked

to leave nor did the work crews ever experience any event wherein
Haynes asked them to leave.

Horman has used the property often

and has often had large numbers of guests for church and youth
gatherings at this cabin, and none were ever asked to leave the
Haynes property or were they turned away.

All material for the

Christensen cabin was hauled to the site over the Haynes property
on the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road and there was never any
issue raised about usage of that road. Horman is aware of the
1984 agreement and after that he found the main gate off SR 133
locked which closed the road leading from SR 133 to Haynes
property, and he removed the gate by force on two occasions,
believing the 1984 agreement allowed access.

He further

developed two retaining and fishing ponds on Section 31 of T2 R8,
and accessed those by what is called the West Fork Road, crossing
Haynes property with large equipment and a crew and those too had
free access across Haynes property &long the Bench Road. Those
have been stocked with fish regularly, at least every other year,
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and private suppliers have been hired and have come to the Jacob
property to plant the fish across the Bench Road onto the West
Fork Road. Jacob, through Joe Jacob, put up signs on the gate
leading from Haynes Bench Road to the Middle Fork Road on Jacob
property, indicating private property and no trespassing*

There

is also a gate on the property line between the Boyer property by
Boyer Lake and the Jacob property, and that is to keep the water
users from the Jacob property. He never saw a gate locked between
1965 and 1975 onto the Haynes property. He graded the entire
road, the entire loop, often during the 1970s.

During the 1980s

and into the early 1990s Alfred Blonquist, working at the time
for Geary Construction, was hired to grade the road and he did it
yearly along the entire loop.

Blonquist was hired by Jacob and

by the Hoytsville water users to do that work.
54.

The Jacobs have had a presence on their property also.

They too went often to the property and were never stopped, never
asked to leave.

They have brought large groups of people also,

church and youth groups, and have not been blocked from using the
Bench Road and Middle Fork Road.

They have invited various

others, such as pond inspectors when they built fishing ponds on
their property.

The Jacobs also testify there was never a locked

gate at entrance off SR 133 before 1984 ^ There was one sign, X5132, on Middle Fork Road heading north off Jacob property to the
Haynes property.

It states "limited access road next 5.15 miles.
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No Hunting, No Trespassing.

Haynes Land & Livestock Co." That

sign has been in place for some time. That sign is seen one
leaves the Jacob property, off the Middle Fork Road, onto the
Haynes property, the Bench Road,

There was no testimony but the

court finds, based on its travel to the site with counsel, that
the distance between SR 133 and the boundary line between
Sections 18-19 is approximately 5 miles.
55. The 1984 Agreement, X255, is between Haynes and Jacob.
It, in summary, indicated Jacob had certain claims, Haynes
recognized the 1939 deed granting access, and stated Jacob could
have a right of way as described in the 1939 deed but Jacob
claimed further rights; Haynes was allowed to keep a gate but
would provide either 100 keys to Jacob or a combination allowing
access.

Jacob agreed to allow Haynes a perpetual easement and

right of access for irrigation purposes in sections 20 and 21.
Both parties reserved any rights they claim.
56. Robert Powell, not associated with either party, is a 79
year old man who grew up in the Coalville area on a small farm
and he often went to the East Fork drainage area. He went to the
area often with his father in their 1934 truck, and the road was
not blocked

nor was the gate locked.

They usually went to what

are called the Blue L^kes, which consist of what is now Boyer
Reservoir, Joyce Lake, and Blue Lake, which is east of Boyer
Reservoir in T2 R8 Section 35. An incident he recalled in the
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1940s happened where some man, not identified, said the road was
private and Powell's father said it was not, it was open to all
and that he had used it for years. In 1965 Powell recalled the
gate being unlocked but locked in the 1980s.

He as never stopped

in his journeys. He did not describe the route of travel.
57. Kay Crittendon, not associated with any parties, is an
85 year old man and life long resident of Coalville. He often
fished at the Blue Lakes before 1935 and there were no gates or
fences and no signs, and that was true until 1941.

After 1935

his father did all the road work and helped build the Boyer
Reservoir.

He produced photographs from 1938 showing the East

Fork Road at section 8 ended there.

(X52-1 through 52-4,

originals returned to Crittendon and copies substituted in the
court record), His father cut the road east and south from the
middle of section 8 where the East Fork Road ended and helped
build what is now the current East Fork Road in 1938-1941.
Crittendon fished at those lakes after World War II and when more
people, sometimes called the "city savages," began to frequent
the area Howard Haynes Sr* began to try to stop the invasion by
halting people at SR 133, Crittendon saw the dipping corrals in
Section 19 T2 R8 and observed them just off the road Middle Fork
Road.
58. Alfred Blonquist, one of the owners of the Boyer parcel,
was given a copy of a map before he bought the property.

That
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map, X205, shows the entire loop at issue was declared a Class D
county road in 1978.

That map's origin is unknown but it was

created and filed with the Utah Department of Transportation in
1978 pursuant to statute, now UCA 72-3-105.

There was no county

commission resolution or approval and no records appear to be
extant which shed any light on how that Class D map came into
being, it just exists and is on file with UDOT. It is also kept
available for the public with the Summit County Recorder. It
shows the entire loop is a Class D road since 1978.

A Class D

road is one that involves no maintenance by the county.
59. The deposition of Gwennola Blonquist, now deceased, was
received on behalf of Haynes. She was born 1912, lived in the
Coalville area until 1933, left, and returned in about 1940.

As

a youth she and others went to the Blue Lakes without permission
and lots of people used the roads and those lakes.

They usually

went via East Fork Road but the deposition did not, to the court,
clearly identify the precise route. She saw Jimmy's saw mill and
corrals which were along the Bench and Middle Fork Road, saw no
signs or fences or gates, and all was open. Her family got lumber
from the area without permission though that route wa& not notes
as to how they got wherever they went.

Small boats were on the

lakes and were used by various people,
60. The deposition of' Lament Staley, born in 1927, was
received, as he now lives elsewhere* He lived in the area and
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also went with his father in the mid 1930s to the area.

They

found what they believed was the crumbled cabin of his
grandfather William by Red Hole Section 18, which is accessed by
the Bench Road. He went on scout trips in about 1935 to Blue Lake
without permission. He did not recall any gates and thinks it was
all open. His route was not well identified.
61. In March 2006 Haynes has petitioned, as shown in X134,
the Summit County Board of Commissioners (SCBC) to vacate the
Class D road which has been on file with UDOT.
hearing the SCBC deferred action. X135.

In an April 2006

In September 2006 a

petition for reconsideration was filed by Haynes, and a hearing
was held February 14, 2007. X302, 260. The county has deferred
action until this litigation is resolved. After this court issued
its ruling denying Jacob's motion for summary judgment in March
2007 Haynes again wrote the SCBC in April 2007 asking for another
public hearing in May 2007. X303. That was evidently denied.
Another letter was sent by Haynes in July 2007 asking for a
public hearing. Another formal request was filed by Haynes in
August 2007 on behalf of Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users,
joined by Haynes and Triple H.

X304,

62. Haynes has placed some of their property in a
Conservation Easement in 1999. Haynes granted the easement to the
State of Utah who may monitor compliance and is to preserve the
Conservation Values of the property.

Haynes reserved the right
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to build structures on Section 18 T2 R8, Section 1 T2 R7,
including as many as 6 cabins of up to 2500 square feet, along
with out buildings. A Ranch Headquarters was allowed on Section 1
T2 R7 or Section 36 T3 R7, each such section being in the
northern portions of the Haynes property accessed by the Bench
Road.
63. There was ample contrary testimony from witnesses called
by Haynes to contradict the recent use of the road at issue, the
entire loop.
64. One of the current partners in Haynes, Howard Haynes,
Jr. MD, a man of 87, first went with his father to the property
in about 1934 after the northern portions were purchased in 1932.
He helped with the sheep and other chores, trailed (or drove) the
sheep from Tooele to this land for Summer grazing, and did many
tasks over the years. He testified at that time he believed the
intervening land (Sections 7, 8, 16, 17, and 18, T2 R8, not owned
by Haynes until about 1941), were crossed to get to the north
portion of the Haynes property under the assumption that there
was some sort of permission from the owners at the time.

The

East Fork Road ended at Section 8. The reservoir company
furthered the road to get to the reservoir, Boyer Reservoir. His
father kept the gate locked as much as possible with the intent
to keep people, the public, out.

He now runs the ranch with his

sister Shirley MacFarlane. The property was heavily guarded in
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hunting season, basically the Fall of each year, and the gate was
locked as much as possible. Haynes has built one cabin on the
property but the evidence did not reveal its location and the
court does not recall seeing it. The court does recall seeing a
small cabin off to the west of the Bench Road possibly in Section
18 or Section 7 T2 R8 and that may be the cabin referenced by the
testimony..

When problems began to arise in about 1981 he

entered into the 1984 agreement, X255.

Historically he recalls a

saw mill, called Jimmy's, near the Haynes-Jacob border by
Sections 18-19, and the Bench Road was well defined when the
property was first purchased when he first went there.
65. Haynes partner and sister Shirley MacFarlane, born in
1935, went often to the property and it was always gated, there
were signs, and it was guarded in hunting season.
66. That agreement, X255, basically gives Jacob the right to
use the Bench Road for the purposes in the deeds
(agricultural)and a key or combination system was put in place so
Jacob could use the road. Jacob gave Haynes an irrigation
easement on Section 20 and 21 to install a head gate. Each party
reserved any rights and claims it had.
67. A deposition of Leroy Meadows, age 85, was received and
considered.

He was a local man and visited often in the area.

He recalled a gate in about 1926, and always got permission from
Howard Haynes, Sr, to use the land, -or from the Wright Brothers,
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the previous owners.
very primitive.

The East Fork Road was not a road and was

By reputation in the area the road, the entire

loop, was private and controlled by Haynes.
68. The

Clyde Collard deposition was also received.

He was

a man of age 8 6 when deposed in 2006 and he was familiar with the
area. He ran sheep on the Jacob property by lease, after World War
II. He recalled the gate being locked most of the time and Jacob
also had a locked gate leading to Jacob's property.

The East

Fork Road was hardly ever traveled.
69. Many others, including Thomas Moore, a part-time fire
marshal, were in the area since the 1970s and stated the gate off
SR 133 was locked and Haynes tried to keep people off the road.
Many others on behalf of Haynes testified concerning the road
recent years, since the 1960s or so. They have been on the
property and the main gate off SR 133 was usually locked and
Haynes attempted to keep people off the road.
70. In September 1998 the deputy county attorney for Summit
County wrote counsel for Haynes and stated the county took no
official position on whether the road at issue, the entire loop,
was or was not a public thoroughfare by operation of State
statute. That contrasts with the current Summit County position
which is that this entire loop road is a Class D county road and
a public road.
71. The road across the Boyer Reservoir, a portion of the
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Boyer Road, is only 12 feet wide.

It goes across the top of the

dam, which is inspected by state Department of Natural Resources
personnel.

It is classified as a high hazard dam should it fail.

Outlet issues have arisen and the State officials have indicated
the measuring devices need greater protection.
any traffic across the top of the dam.

They discourage

If the road remains those

dam officials recommend a 20-24 foot wide road at the top, which
would require substantial cost of approximately $900,000 to
change the Boyer Reservoir system.
72. The Water Users initiated litigation in 1939 to condemn
the land for what is called the Boyer Reservoir, though it was a
natural reservoir before, as well as seek the roadway on the East
Fork Road.

The jury awarded damages for that taking in 1942.

73. After all the conflicts in that testimony concerning the
use bf the properties, the gates and locks and signs, the court
finds that after Howard Haynes Sr bought the final portion of the
Haynes property in 1941 the gates were locked most of the time
and it was the intent of Haynes to keep people off the property.
Further, after Joe Jacob bought the property from about the same
time frame in 1938 he locked the gate from Haynes property to the
Jacob property at Sections 18-19 T2 R8 and it wa3 Jacob's intent
to keep th^ public off the property.

Factually since 1941 the

Bench Road and the Middle Fork Road and the East Fork Road have
been private roads and hove not become public roads through usage
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by the public since that time,
74. The court finds this road at issue is basically a
"summer" road.

There was no direct testimony as to the amount of

snowfall at any given time but the court does not exist in a
vacuum and can take judicial notice, even without being requested
to do so in a civil matter under URE, Rule 201, of facts
generally known-

The court is not taking judicial notice that

the road at issue is or is not passable at any given time, nor of
precisely how much snow there'is at any particular time, but
there is a lot of snow this season and the court believes at this
elevation this road is not visible or accessible by motor vehicle
a good part of the year. Further, the court went on the "field
trip" on October 3, 2007, and had off-the-record discussions with
counsel.

From all of the descriptions of the use of this road,

it is clear that the "road" is not used when there is substantial
snow on the ground.

Snowmobiles have been alluded to in the

trial and on the field trip and clearly the snow fall in this
area prohibits use by motor vehicle when there is substantial
snow.

A snowmobile may ride "over" the road but not along it.

When the court went on the field trip there were patches of snow
on the north side of trees and hills and that was October 3,
2007.

The court was advised that the Jacob Cabins are located at

approximately 9100 feet above sea level and at times they have
been completely covered by snow. During trial, in a recess off
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the record, the court indicated somewhat jokingly to counsel it
would like to go back to the property, being aware there was
still substantial snow in the area.

The court was advised by

someone there was probably still approximately 10 feet of snow by
the Jacob cabins.

From all this, the court finds that whatever

use is and has been made of the road, that use by vehicles is
seasonal and basically non-existent when there is substantial
snowfall.

The lowest of the Haynes property is approximately

7500 feet above sea level.

Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes
the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The court will discuss the law it is relying not in an
attempt to educate the parties or anyone else but itself. The
parties have filed helpful memoranda, but in an effort to
demonstrate why the court is concluding as it is the court
recites its understanding of the governing law.
2. Jacob's first alternative relief is for the court to
declare this entire loop is a public road under law.

As noted in

the court's previous ruling in March 2007, the relative
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simplicity of what is called the Dedication Statute, UCA 72-5104, belies the difficulty of this case.

This case is a very,

very difficult case for the court and it is not a clear cut case
at all.

The court is attempting to follow the law and do equity

as the relief sought, declaration of a public road, is an

equitable remedy. Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches,
211,

213

(UT 1981),

639 P. 2d

The court is also trying to solve an ongoing

problem between the parties and is trying not to create
additional litigation.
3. The case, by its nature, is very difficult.

As has been

recognized in such "public road cases/' a trial court is given a
fair degree of discretion in determining the legal consequences
of the facts as found by the court because the legal requirements
are highly fact dependent and somewhat amorphous. Heber
v.

Simpson,

942 P. 2d 301,

311

(UT. 1997).

City

Corp

These cases by their

nature, especially this one because Jacob has asked the court to
make a determination from a time beginning almost 150 years ago,
involve "reconstruction of historical facts concerning timing,
nature, and the extent of public usage. . . [W]itnesses are
required to dredge the recesses of their minds for aged memories.
. . . Trial courts should be permitted some rein to grapple with
the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute . . . "

[a

public road]. Kohler

App.

1996).

v. Martin,

916 P.2d

910,

912-913

(UT.

Whether the facts show a public road is a question of fact
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and law which involves complex facts, evidentiary resolutions and
credibility determinations. The court finds and concludes in this
case there are very, very few credibility determinations at issue
of any importance. Almost all the witnesses are found to be
honest and credible and they saw events as they believed them to
be from their perspective. Almost none of the court's decisions
are governed by credibility determinations.
4. This case is again made very difficult by the history
involved.

As found and discussed herein, the "original" owners

back in the early 1940s were Howard Haynes Sr and Joe Jacob,
along with of course the Christensen family and other siblings of
those two principal operators of the land. Now a few generations
have passed and the offspring of those men are at odds. The
problem has been discussed in many cases, such as Southern
Wilderness

Alliance

v.

BLM, 425 F.3d

735 (10th

Cir.

Utah

2005).

While

that case was in a differing context, the problem is now that
what was once used as part of the public lands is now in the
hands of private individuals.

The owners whose land is crossed

(Haynes) do not want their land disturbed, ruined, full of
strangers and "city savages" who may destroy the beauty and peace
of the area and interfere with a livestock business. Indeed,
Shirley MacFarlane indicated that the Jacob property users were
using the Bench Road as a speed way and she feared for the safety
of the Haynes families. The Jacobs on the other hand want to
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enjoy their property in the same fashion and be free to allow
their families, now growing larger just as the Haynes families
are growing, to fully use and enjoy their land and not be stuck
with only the ability, figuratively, to herd sheep down the road.
The Jacobs and Christensens have built a few cabins and want to
build a few more-

The Haynes fear the Jacobs will build a

veritable city and those residents will have to cross the Haynes
land to get to that "city."

The Jacobs believe they have the

right to enjoy their property as they have done in the past and
that now means building some additional cabins for their
increasing family and does not mean having to use only the two
small cabins (one is about 700 square feet and one 2500 square
feet) to attempt to house and provide a refuge and retreat for a
large family.

Each party clearly has a very profound sense of

right and entitlement and the court's determination will affect
these parties greatly, as well as several generations of their
families yet to come.
8. The case is again made more difficult because of the
nature of the claim of Jacobs, particularly its timing-that this
entire loop was and is a public road from over 100 years ago,
beginning perhaps as early as 1865, but certainly in the period
1881? £or1896. fftat obviously Entails proof of facts mostly from
documents rather than live witnesses.

No witnesses appeared, nor

could any be expected to, who were alive before 1896.

Further,
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Haynes argued correctly that it could not possibly prove a
negative from that time frame.

Proving a negative is at best

difficult and from this time frame may well be impossible. As
noted by the court in the summary judgment determination, it
would be highly unlikely to find a government record or newspaper
article from, for example, 1892, indicating that no one used the
East Fork loop this season.

It is, of course, not the burden of

Haynes to disprove public use but it is the burden of Jacob to
prove public use and all that those elements entail.
9. This case is also somewhat unique in that it is from a
time when the lands at issue were in the public domain. As
found, prior to statehood in 1896, all of these sections and
lands at issue, all of them, were in the public domain. The even
numbered sections belonged to the United States and in 1869 the
odd numbered sections belonged to the railroads through a grant
from the United States.

From that time (1869) until about

statehood in 1896, the odd numbered sections belonged to the
railroads.

The only odd numbered sections involved as far as

public use in this case has been principally Section 7. Most of
the cases the courts have considered involved a private party
seeking to have a road that passes over the private property of
another declared public. This case differs in that most
important regard.
10. This case is also complicated for the court in that the
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parties, respectfully, all seemed to concentrate on the entirety
of the road, the entire loop, without any emphasis on any
particular portion of the road. The court believes the evidence
was such that the parties probably could have and should have
focused on a more discrete portion of the road- The court does
not fault the parties for so arguing, but the court does not
believe that the entire road merits factually or legally the same
result.
11. All of this apologetic aside, this is a close and
difficult case for the court.
12.

The statute, the Dedication Statute, under which Jacob

seeks a declaration by the court that this entire loop is a
public road, states:
(1)

A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use
of the public when it has been continuously used
as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years.

(2)

The dedication and abandonment creates a rightof-way held by the state in accordance with
Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103.

(3)

The scope of the right-of-way is that which is
reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel
according to the facts and circumstances.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-104

(2000).

13. As the Utah Supreme Court has noted in Lindsay

Livestock

v. Churnos,

Land &

285 P. 646, the federal legislation from

1866 allowing SR 2477 roads could be viewed as an offer from the
United States of a free right of way over the public domain.

The

-51-

001443

enactment of Utah statutes, as well as the common law, is the
Utah answer of how that offer has been accepted.
14.

It is clear that one who claims a public road exists

must prove the road is public and has been abandoned and
Heber

dedicated to the public by clear and convincing evidence.
v. Simpson,

at 310.

Additionally "the burden of establishing

public use for the required period of time is on those claiming
it". Bertagnole

1981).

v.

Pine

Meadow Ranches,

639 P. 2d 211f

213

(Utah

These principles guided the court in its denial of summary

judgment for Jacob wherein the court stated Jacob had an "uphill"
battle but would have to prove a public ro^d at trial.
15. Defendants are required to show by clear and convincing
evidence that this is a public road and they claim it became such
in the time frame of 1880-1896. That burden of proof requires
defendants to produce evidence that causes the court to have a
firm belief this is a public road. The evidence must reach the
point where there remains no substantial doubt that this is a
public road.

That is the standard the court is using to

determine if defendant has shown by clear and convincing evidence
that there has been a public road created in the time frame
alleged.

Whatever definition of "clear and convincing" is used,

that burden of proof is less than beyond a reasonable doubt. The
court is entitled, as the finder of fact, to draw reasonable
inferences from the facts proven and found.

It is clear that one
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witness can establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt and one
witness can establish a fact by clear and convincing evidence as
well. Bonner v.
16.

Sudbury,

411 P.2d

646 (UT.

1966).

Recently the Utah Supreme Court decided a trilogy of

cases in February 2008 which discuss the Dedication Statute and
apply to this case to some extent, though not entirely.
cases are, of course, Utah County
County

v.

Okelberry,

v.

Butler,

Those

2008 UT 12;

2008 UT 10; and Town of Leeds

v.

Wasatch
Prisbey,

2008 UT 11.
17. For purposes of this case only a few of the important
holdings have an effect.

In discussing the elements required for

a public road to be found the Court made it clear, again, that
the burden is on the claimant of a public road to prove it by
clear and convincing evidence. In Okelberry

the Court focused on

what qualifies as a sufficient interruption to restart the
running of the 10 year period and stated a bright line rule:
An overt act that is intended by a property owner to
interrupt the use of a road as a public thoroughfare,
and is reasonably calculated to do so, constitutes
an interruption sufficient to restart the running of
the required ten-yeaj: period under the Dedication
Statute.

2008 UT 14,15.

Thus, the burden remains on Jacob to prove the road has been
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dedicated to the public continuously.

Evidence of an

interruption in that 10 year period simply precludes a finding of
continuous use.
18. From this bright-line rule it is clear to the court and
the court finds and concludes Jacob and Boyer have failed to show
this road, the entire loop, was a public road since 1941.

Haynes

and all their witnesses absolutely preclude the court from
finding by clear and convincing evidence that the gate off SR 133
was not locked at least once for a period of 10 years.

There was

a good deal of conflict in the testimony and the court need not
and did not find which "side" is correct, but the court has
absolutely no difficulty in determining that the court is not
convinced by Jacob that since Haynes owned the Haynes property
finally in 1941 that the road was continuously used by the
public.

Indeed, Jacob in essence concedes as much.

Haynes,

through Howard Haynes Sr and others clearly locked gates and put
up signs telling people, in essence, to keep out.

Jacob did the

same on its property line, and locked a gate. Since these parties
have owned the property, at least since 1941, this has not been
dedicated as a public road.
19. Before 1941, of course, is whista the Jacob parties claim
this road became public under law., There is no genuine dispute
about any ten year period at that time as there was virtually no
compelling evidence that there were gates or fences or signs or
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anything else before that time. There was some evidence produced
by Haynes that gates were up as early as 1932, and one witness
through deposition thought a gate was in place in 1928, when
Haynes bought the east and north portions of his property, but
the court will not focus on that time period between 1932 and
1941 in any event.

The court will do as asked by Jacob and

examine and discuss the evidence as to use by the public,
continuously, before 1932.

After that time no public road was

created by public use under the Dedication Statute.
20. Turning to whether this road has been used by the public
before 1932 continuously for an uninterrupted period of ten years
requires an examination of what the "public" is.

This case

becomes more complex and somewhat unguided by past cases because
of, again, the time frame and the public nature of the land
before 1896, before statehood.
21. The recent Butler

case is helpful but not fully

determinative of an issue in this case.

The public must use the

road and it must be a public thoroughfare before a road can be
determined to be a public road under the Dedication Statute.
Butler

makes clear that those with a private right to use a road,

such as adjoining property owners or those with permission or
some prescriptive right, are not members of the public,

"People

as a whole" are considered the public, and that class includes
all trespassers, those with no right to be on the road at all.
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22, If the public used this road, meaning the entire loop,
it must be for 10 years without interruption as Okelberry
clear.

Under Butler,

makes

the ten year period need not be specified,

the period must simply be at least 10 years.

Here, based on the

evidence, the court concludes that people (the court will discuss
whether those people amount to the "public"* using a "public
thoroughfare" later) certainly used portions of this road (to be
discussed later) for at least 10 years, from perhaps 1865 to
1932, and certainly up to the time of statehood in 1896. The
court finds that evidence overwhelming in fact, despite its
previous doubts expressed in the court's denial of the summary
judgment motion brought by Jacob,

The court has now had the

advantage of hearing much additional evidence, more carefully
considering the documents and relating them to the property
actually viewed by the court, and having more full argument.

As

found, many, many people before 1932 used portions of this road.
There were several sawmills along various portions of the road.
There were many, many sheep that were "dipped," at corrals in the
area requiring the presence of many people. Many people hunted,
fished, and went to the lakes by some route or another.

While

the court has found the use seasonal because of the heavy
snowfall, the court concludes that the use of portions of the
road was continuous. The use of the road need not be great and
comparatively few people can use a road to make it public, but
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when the need to use a road arises and the road is used, that use
is continuous. Boyer

v.

Clark,

326 P.2d

101,

1008-109

(UT

1958).

Natural occurrences, such as flood or snow, which inhibit usage
of the road do not halt continuous use under the law. Butler,
13.

at

If the road is used as often as needed or convenient or

necessary, even though the use is not constant, it is continuous
use under the law and mere intermissions by naturally occurring
events, other than an intentional act of interruption, will not
halt the continuous nature of the use. Here, pre-1932 and
certainly pre-1896 the evidence is again overwhelming that a
large number of persons used some portion of the road for many,
many purposes on a regular and ongoing basis.
23. Those purposes are sufficient to establish a road by
whatever name.

In Boyer the Court described the use as being use

by persons hauling coal, crossing the open range, driving cattle
and sheep, and people hunting or visiting others.
by wagon or other vehicles or horse.

The travel was

The court found that

sufficient to establish a public road.

Interestingly, that case

arose in Chalk Creek in Summit County as well in an area not far
from this East Fork drainage area.

The Court did not comment or

discuss the public nature of the domain at the time.

Trial was

in 1956 and the trial court found facts dating back 50 years, to
presumably about 1900, at or shortly after statehood.
24. In Lindsay

Livestock

v.

Chumps,

285 P. 646

(UT.

1929)
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the court dealt with a claim under the predecessor dedication
statute.

There the Court dealt with a time period from 1876 and

involved findings that the land was patented in about 1900.
There the lands were similar to these, described as unenclosed,
uninhabited mountain lands, suitable only for grazing.

Lindsay

involved sheep grazing in the summers, sawmills in 187 6, as well
as a mining camp.

Persons used the road at issue in that case to

get lumber and work at and visit the mining camp, houses were
built at the camp, and the use was extensive from 187 6, though
the mining camp lasted only about 5 years. Since 1900 the use was
basically only sheep herders moving sheep, supplying sheep camps,
and fishermen and hunters. No public money was expended on the
road. The road found to be public in that case was found not to
be the identical road at the time of trial as was the previous
use but it was located in substantially the same place. The
Court upheld the finding of a public road, again without much
comment about the public nature of the land involved.
25. The Court upheld the finding of a public road in Jeremy
v.

Bertagnole,

116 P.2d

420

(UT 1941).

Important to this case is

the characterization of the early road, from about 1869, as a
"trail" or roadway. The road was found to have been used for
trailing herds of cattle, sheep, and horses* The Court did note
that all patents issued were subject to the easements and rights
of way of the public to use all such roads as may have been
-58-

established according to law.
26. Thus, whatever persons used this road, and the court
calls it a road, they did so continuously for over 10 years
before statehood while the lands were all in the public domain.
27. The next issue the court must discuss is just what
portion of this road was used.
focused on the entire loop.

The parties, again respectfully,

The court in its findings has

basically divided the road into four parts for its discussion:
The Bench Road across Haynes property, the Middle Fork across the
Jacob property, the Boyer road across the Boyer property, and the
East Fork Road across Haynes property going east then south from
the Bench Road.

The court does not believe the evidence merits

treating the entire road, the entire loop, identically.
28. Without yet addressing whether the use was public, the
court has found and concludes that the Bench Road and Middle
Fork, to a somewhat imprecise ending, as well as a portion of the
East Fork road to a somewhat imprecise ending, have been used by
persons continuously for over 10 years. The East Fork beyond the
middle of Section 8 T2 R8 and the Boyer Road have not been shown
by clear and convincing evidence to have been used by persons,
whether t^« pufelic or not, continuously for ten years.
29. The court has found, as discussed, that the E^st Fork
road, based on testimony of Howard Haynes Jr, Kay Crittendon, and
the early map of 1903 (X134) demonstrate beyond doubt that Jacob
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has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that a particular
route was used along the East Fork after leaving the middle of
Section 8.

That area was described as terrible passage, a rock

pile, and other terms showing it was not heavily or as regularly
used as the Bench and Middle Fork Roads. Jacob has shown that the
route along the Bench Road and Middle Fork Roads was used by
persons regularly and continuously.

The East Fork road was

described as ending in the middle of Section 8 and the early maps
show that, particularly X134 as reflected in Tab H of X296.

The

road was constructed from the middle of Section 8 for the
reservoir in about 1940, clearly not 10 years before Haynes
blocked access.

Thus, while there is some evidence people went

to the blue Lakes regularly, and some evidence that they went via
East Fork Road, the evidence is not compelling that such use was
continuous as required at least beyond the middle of Section 8.
Had it been, the East Fork Road beyond the middle of Section 8
would have shown up on early maps and it does not.
30. Contrariwise, the demonstrable depiction of the Bench
Road and Middle Fork Roads, to some point within Section 4 T2 R8,
shows a road was created and use.

It is only logical that these

two portions were used by someone or there would not be a road
shown. A passage is created by use, where timber or vegetation is
removed for ease of access. Continuous use allows the passage way
(road) to remain and be depicted on a map.

Similarly as to the
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East Fork Road to the middle of Section 8. A visible road in
1875, 1893, and on all maps thereafter, together with all the
other evidence of vast usage, shows it was from early times in at
least 1875 until statehood, used heavily by persons and that is
what made the road visible to the surveyor and that use is what
made the road visible on maps. The court's comments in its March
2007 ruling to the contrary notwithstanding, the court now having
viewed the area, the court finds and concludes that persons
traveling to the blue Lake area would certainly, at least by very
strong inference, use a road rather than cut through heavy
timber, up and over cliffs and other steep terrain. Persons
obtaining timber, for example, whether from a mill or on their
own from the woods somewhere, would use a wagon to haul the
timber and that wagon would go on this road, rather than through
the wild and over steep terrain or over fallen timber.

While

hunters may have strayed off the beaten path to find game, they
sensibly would travel the road to get to an area to hunt rather
than take off immediately through the wild terrain, even if on
horseback.

That at least is the reasonable inference the court

draws from viewing this area and considering normal and
reasonable human conduct. An inference of reasonable conduct by
persons can amount to clear and convincing evidence in this
court's view, when that inference is based on facts proven
sufficiently.

The presence of sawmills, corrals, and homesteads
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along Bench Road and Middle Fork and along the portion of the
East Fork Road to the middle of Section 8 show many persons were
regularly using this road as far back as 1875.
31. The expert report of Liapis shows that the Bench Road
and Middle Fork Road and the East Fork Road to the middle of
Section 8 are substantially the same now as when first plotted in
1875, and are certainly the same as the 1903 USGS map, X134.
32. That leads the court to the most difficult question
involved, and that is whether those persons using these Bench
Roads and Middle Fork Roads and East Fork Roads to the middle of
Section 8 and those people who "created" these roads by usage
were members of the public and whether it was a public
thoroughfare.
33. The difficult issue in this case is framed by the fact
that when these lands were used by people, the Bench Road and the
Middle Fork Road and the East Fork Road to the middle of Section
8, whoever these people were, the lands they crossed were all
public lands because they were even numbered sections, except a
small portion of Section 35 T3 R7, Section 1 T2 R7 Section 7 T2
R8, and a very small portion of T2 R8 Sections 19 and 33. Thus,
ANYONE who used those sections, for any purpose, appears to the
court to be a member of the public. Timber could be taken,
livestock grazed, hunting could occur, and homesteads could be
established, all without prior public approval or oversight on
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the public lands.

The bulk of the Bench Road and Middle Fork

Road was on public lands as being

in even

numbered

sections.

Only a portion of the East Fork Road is in Section 8 and most of
it is in Section 7. None of these roads crossed private land to
create a situation where another landowner now seeks to take
something away from a previous private landowner as is the case
with most of the previous court cases.

The cases where the

public road was created during the time before statehood do not
discuss this aspect of the facts in any detail but it seems of
utmost importance to this court.

The law is not developed

concerning this issue. It seems almost tautological or
definitional that any use of a road (or tr>al, or passage way) on
public land is a public road.
the public?

Who else did it belong to if not

It was not private and no one is seeking to now make

something public that was private previously.

Jacob in essence

is claiming what was public should remain public.
34. As to the odd number railroad sections there is no
indication in the record that the railroad ever seriously sought
to use this land, nor that any railroad ever attempted to
interfere with its use by the public on these odd numbered
sections.

Thus), while technically perhaps private land as

belonging to the Railroad, the odd numbered sections were really
public as well.

It is certainly clear from the record before the

court that there is no evidence the railroad ever sought to
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exercise its rights as a landowner, during the tenure of
ownership, concerning the odd numbered sections at issue in this
case.
35. Haynes argues that use is presumed permissive but the
court believes that is particularly true when the use is by
prescription. This use is not by prescription as the use of the
road was use of a public road before Haynes owned the property
over which the road passes.
36. Even discounting that concept, however, the court finds
and concludes, based on all the evidence, that these Bench Road
and Middle Fork Road and East Fork Road to the middle of Section
8 portions were used by the public continuously for over 10 years
as a public thoroughfare.
37. The court believes Jacob's reliance on Lee v. Masner,

45

P. 3d 794 (CO. App. 2001) as to when homesteaders become owners is
a reasonable interpretation of the law in Utah. The court agrees
with Haynes that Kohler

v. Martin,

916 P.2d 910, and now

Butler

and other cases make clear that property owners and invitees are
not members of the public.

However, the court does not believe

that the case relied on by Haynes,v Rio Grande Western
v, Telluride,

63 P. 995 (UT* 1900)r

Railway

Co.

stands for what Haynes claims

it stands for*2 While these homesteaders StaLey, Randall, Huff,
2

The court also does not believe a case cited by Haynes in
its pre-trial memo, Thumwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38, states at all
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and Saxton detailed in the findings above had a right to preempt
others perhaps as against their use of the property, nothing in
Utah law the court can find indicates these homesteaders are land
"owners" until at least they apply for homestead rights. Thus,
the court concludes, those homesteaders were members of the
public and it follows their guests and invitees were as well.
Moreover, the court is not basing its conclusion solely on these
homesteaders. They are merely some members of the public who used
these portions of the roads as indicated,
38. The court concludes that many members of the public,
trespassers or whatever they be called before 1896, (and they
were trespassers after 1896 and after others owned the property,)
and all kinds of people used these sections of the Bench and
Middle Fork and East Bench Roads.

Getting lumber, game, and

recreating over the years seems never to have stopped and was
continuous for at least 10 years.

Again, a "lag" in usage,

unless the result of an intentional act of interruption, is not a
basis to conclude the road was not continuously used by the
public. Thousands and thousands of-sheep came to the area and
used the Bench Road and some of the Middle Fork Road to get to
the corrals, and those thousands and thousands of sheep did not
appear only episodically.

Those thousand and thousands of sheep

what Haynes claims for it, though it is not an issue given the
court's resolution. There can be no "taking" as the public road
is found to exist before Haynes owned the property,
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did not get to the corrals or to grazing lands by themselves
under the direction of a sheep dog.

The testimony did not show

such, but again the court may rely on the common sense notion
that thousands and thousands of sheep require more than one
person to herd those sheep.

Indeed, Howard Haynes Jr described

how he helped his father and others with trailing their sheep in
the 1930s from Tooele.

From such facts the court is not amiss in

inferring many sheep herders and others were responsible for many
sheep getting to this area.

Haynes argues these facts as shown

are not evidence of continuous use. The court has discussed that
and use is continuous if use is as needed and desired and is not
interrupted by an intentional act of the owner.

Here, the owner

of the land at the time, 1880-1896, was the public or the
railroad, and no objection was ever lodged by the railroad.
There is no evidence the railroad every did any act amounting to
an act of interruption. The' use was open and the court believes
the use of the land was use of public lands on all sections.
39. Further, while neither this factor nor any one factor is
determinative, Summit County funds were expended on this road on
the Bench Road, referred to in X244 as Sage Brush Flats. That
was in 1913, after these sections were in private ownership but
before Haynes owned the land. That too adds evidence that at
least this portion of the road w&s public.
40. In addition as another factor, while again not
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determinative as noted in Heber City v. Simpson,

at 311 n.8r

the

fact is that Summit County in 1978 determined this was a Class D
county road.

The court is fully aware that this map seems to

have been created almost immaculately as there is no evidence as
to its etiology. However, the map exists and is kept in the
County Recorder's Office and is on file with UDOT pursuant to
statute.
41. Even if not used as a public road for years as a public
road since these parties have owned the land, at least since 1941
and possibly since 1932, the public nature of the road does not
"disappear" when the land over which the public road crosses
comes into private hands.

The purchaser, Haynes and before

Haynes other owners, and Jacob and before Jacob others, all took
the property subject to the public's right to use the roads.

Sullivan,

at

957.

42. It is the totality of the evidence that convinces the
court by clear and convincing evidence these portions of the road
were used by the public continuously for'at least 10 years, from
at least 1880 to 1896.
43. The burden of the usage on Haynes is not as great as if
Haynes had owned the land when this road was made public by
public use.
occurring.

Haynes frequently argued a taking of land is
As noted, this court does believe that this land was

public and the road over that public land was dedicated to the
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public for such use before Haynes or Jacob purchased the land.
These owners took the land subject to the right of the public to
use the road.

Thus, it is not as if Haynes owned landf the

public then crossed it and used it, and thus Haynes is being
deprived of something he had but now has lost. Haynes never
"had" this road, it has been public since long before he
purchased the land surrounding the public road.
44. If a road becomes public under the Dedication Statute
clearly if Haynes or Jacob anyone erects gates and posts signs
those actions do not extinguish the public nature of the road.
Sullivan

v.

Condas,

290 P. 954,

957

(UT. 1930).

This court may

not vacate a public road and the vacation of a public road may
only be done according to law. An adjoining owner of public land
may not obstruct the public right, Schettler
(UT

v. Lynch,

64 P. 955

1901).

45. As to the East Fork Road east of the middle of Section 8
the court concludes as well that there has been no public access
at least since 1941.

Prior to that time the road went to the

middle of section 8 T2 R8 as shown on the early maps, the same as
show the Bench and Middle Fork Roads. From the middle of Section
8 going east then south the court does not believe that portion
of the road ever became public because of its much more limited
use.

The court was not and is not convinced by clear and

convincing evidence that after the usage of the road to the saw
-68-

001460

mills in the middle of Section 8 and the "bungalows" in that area
the use was anything other than sporadic and the route was and is
unknown. While there were some references to going that way to
the blue Lakes, the use beyond the saw mills by hunters and
fishermen and others was far more limited and not conclusive by
clear and convincing evidence that that portion of the East Fork
Road was ever abandoned and dedicated to the public.

Certainly

until about 1940 when the present iteration of the road was
constructed by the Water Users the descriptions of the area
included phrases such as rocky, a wagon trail, a terrible route,
almost unpassable, and so forth.

While such can still be a road,

the court is not convinced by clear and convincing evidence that
any particular route was traveled beyond the middle of Section 8.
To the extent it was traveled, its use was not continuous and was
at best episodic by far less members of the public than traversed
the Bench Road or Middle Fork Road or the East Fork Road to the
middle of Section 8.

The more heavy usage to Peter's Park, so

called, was before the split of the road*

The two homesteads

that were in the area were at the middle of Section 8 and were
accessed by the East Fork Road as it ended at the middle of
Section 8. the one §aw mill just east of the.split of the road in
Section 7 is certainly similar in character as the sai$6 features
of usage on the Bench and Middle Fork Roads,

However/ the court

finds the evidence of usage simply not as convincing beyond the
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mapped ending of the East Fork Road at the middle of Section 8.
46. Thus, the court concludes that the only public road from
the early days of 1880 to 1896 and beyond until about 1932 was
what the court is calling the Bench Road, the Middle Fork Road,
and the East Fprk Road to the middle of Section 8.
47. As to the remainder of what is now the East Fork Road,
however, the Jacob-Christensen entities have been given by
stipulation a prescriptive easement to use that road for
traditional purposes for which Jacob has used it in the past.
That is, for recreation and moving livestock as read into the
record at the beginning of trial. The Jacob-Christensen family
may continue to use that East Fork Road simply for access as
agreed by Haynes but it may not be used for other purposes if
Jacob desires to in fact build additional cabins, for example.
That has not been the traditional use of that portion of the
road. The public road may be used for those reasons beyond the
stipulated prescriptive easement but the East Fork Road east of
the middle of Section 8 may be used only for pure access
traditional purposes.

for the

It will also allow ingress and egress in

case of some type of emergency.

Of course, in an emergency

easements are not governing in any event.

Simply, the East Fork

Road east of the middle of Section 8 is not now and has not ever
been a public road Under the Dedication Statute.
47. The court is aware that does not solve the Boyerfs
-70-

001462

problem as to the East Fork Road.

The court does not believe

that the Boyer's have established a prescriptive easement over
the East Fork Road for at least 20 years before ownership by
Haynes.

Before statehood use by Boyers was not shown.

After

ownership of property in about 1905 the travel demonstrated by
Boyers was for purposes of going to the lakes and nothing more.
That court concludes that is not sufficient to demonstrate a
prescriptive easement for the Boyers over the entirety of East
Fork Road.

If they desire to build a cabin, as they testified,

the route to be used would have to be along the public road of
the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road. Any access the Boyers have
to their property has to be over the public road and then by
permission by Jacob.
48. That leaves the Boyer Road at issue.

The court is not

attempting to resolve any reservoir disputes, but the court has
seen no convincing evidence that at any point in time, except
recently, that the road across the Boyer Reservoir was used by
anyone.

Of all the travel to the blue Lakes for varying purposes

by the public or by the Boyers or even the Jacobs, the evidence
is not convincing that the road used went across the Boyer
Reservoir.

The court concludes that the Boyer Road is then not

the subject of being a public road nor has anyone shown a
prescriptive easement right to use the Boyer Road.

The Boyer

Road on the Boyer property is for their use and for the use of
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those they allow to use that road.

With the availability of the

public road along the Bench Road and the Middle Fork road to a
point to be discussed further below both the Jacob and Boyer
entities may use that road to the point where the public road
ends in Section 4.

Beyond that, and onto the Boyer property, the

Boyer's will have to obtain access by permission of Jacob to go
from that point to the Boyer property where the current iteration
of the road leaves the Jacob property onto the Boyer property in
Section 34 T2 R8.
49. The court concludes, based on the testimony and again
relying heavily on X134 and X296, that the public used the Bench
and Middle Fork Roads as shown on X134 to the eastern most point
on the Jacob property where the road crosses from Tl R8 Section 4
into T2 R8 Section 33.

At that point the public road established

by the testimony from 1880 and beyond has not been shown to have
been established.

Thus, any use of the road beyond that point by

anyone will have to be permissive. The travel routes shown on
X134 and the historic usage described leads the court to find and
conclude that is the approximate point where the public gained
access to the lakes.

Beyond that lies the Boyer property line in

Section 34 from the Jacob property and the evidence does not
convince the court that any particular route was used to gain
access to the blue lakes area, and certainly there was
insufficient evidence (if any) that the public went across the
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Boyer property and across the Boyer Reservoir,
50. Thus, the court concludes the road as it currently
exists, what the court is calling the Middle Fork Road, ends as a
public road where it crosses at the eastern most point from Tl R8
Section 4 onto T2 R8 Section 33 as now shown on X117.
Thereafter, through the Jacob property and across the Boyer
property on what the court is calling the Boyer Road, the road is
a private road and may be blocked and permission may be given or
obtained for the use of the road or any existing easement may
allow access.

The Boyer Road is private except as to any

easement in favor of the Watet Users, who also enjoy a
prescriptive easement along the East Fork Road to the Boyer
property and to the Boyer Reservoir.
51. Thus, to summarize, the court, from the evidence,
concludes that the East Fork Road is a public road from the point
in Section 7 T2 R8 where it splits from the Bench Road to the
middle of Section 8. From that point the East Fork Road is
private.

Jacob enjoys a historic easement along that road from

the middle of Section 8 only for access as historically used.
The Boyers do not enjoy a similar prescriptive easement for the
same purposes. The Water Users fcnjoy a prescriptive easement
along that toad as well as Jacob ^ut only as necessary for its
purposes.

Where that East Fork Road joins onto the Boyer

property at the tri-junction of the Haynes, Jacob and Boyer
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properties, at the junction of T2 R8 Sections 34 and Section 27,
the road remains private through the Boyer property in Section 34
and it remains private until, going southerly, it enters the
Jacob property at the eastern most portion of the division of
Sections 33 T2 R8 and Section 4 Tl R8. The Water Users enjoy a
prescriptive easement on the Boyer Road and any other use by
others is permissive. The road is then public back to SR 133 from
the Jacob property going along the Middle Fork and Bench Roads.
Boyer does not enjoy a prescriptive easement from its property to
the point the pubic road begins and any access will have to be by
permission of Jacob.
In an attempt to again clarify, BASICALLY as shown on X117,
the court is concluding, with the slight adjustments noted above,
that as shown on X117, Section A so labeled is public, Section C
is private, and Section D is private subject to the easements
described. Section B is public.
52. One,of the arguments Haynes has made against any portion
of the road being declared public is that it goes ''nowhere,"
there is no destination, it does not lead to a public place or
even a particular site.

That has indeed caused the court some

concern throughout this litigation. In fact the court is aware of
a few cases cited by the parties that deal with & "dead end" as a
public road. In Renfro

v McCowan, 2006 Dist.

LEXIS

84439,

the

road found to be public went to a "view" area as described by the
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court- In Bertagnole

1981),

v.

Pine Meadow Ranches,

639 P. 2d 211,

(UT.

the road seems to go to many, many cabins, but it does not

lead to some other public area and when a member of the public
gets to the "end" the same route, with lots of possible branches
and loops, must be taken to return to 1-80. Thus, the road in
that case seems to be similar to the public aspects of this road,
Bertagnole

it leads to a "dead end" with some more loops in the
road up Tolgate Canyon.

The court concludes that such a

"nowhere" road may still be a public road.

The public may drive

this road from SR 133 on either branch, along the East Fork Road
to the middle of section B, or along the Bench and Middle Fork
Roads to Section 4, view the surroundings and turn around and
travel back the same route as they took to SR 133. That is the
nature of public roads under these Dedication Statutes based on
older federal law which allowed creation of such roads. The fact
that the public aspect of this road leads to a "dead end" as far
as an actual destination does not defeat the public nature of its
creation.
53. As to the width and scope of the public road it has been
noted, in Bertagnole

at 213, that the width of a dedicated

highway is not limited to the beaten path. The width of a public
road is to be determined as a question of fact. Butler
The Pinecrest

Water

Company,

909 P.2d

cited for that proposition, Blonquist

225

(UT 1995).

v. Blonquist,

et.al.

v.

In the case
516 P.2d

343
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(UT. 1973),

the court upheld a finding, without much discussion,

of a width of 44 feet as being necessary and reasonable under the
circumstances based upon the uses made of the road.

The width

which is reasonably safe and convenient for which the road was
put is the width to be declared. In Memmott v. Anderson,
(UT. 1982)r

642 750

the trial court declared a public road a certain

width and the Supreme Court found it was unable to determine what
basis was, used to determine the declared width.

Bertagnole

categorized, at 213-214, some past cases involving mountain
canyons, and discussed findings of 44 feet, 60 and 82.5 feet in
varying parts, 49.5 feet and 100 feet. The court in Jeremy v.
Bertagnole,

116 P.2d

420

(UT 1941)

discussed a public road

created similarly to this case. That case made clear the width of
the road is not to be measured by the width of the beaten track.
It was necessary for the court to determine, according to what
was reasonable and necessary, under all the facts and
circumstances, the proper width and "where the public have
acquired the right to a public highway by user, they"are [not]
limited to such width as has actually been used by them." That
court noted that generally the greater portion of travel on a
county road is confined to the tracks made by vehicles, but there
must bee room enough for, travelers to pass each other. The road
must be kept in such condition that the public will be safe and
their rights protected.

That court was citing Lindsay

Land which
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had indicated that the declared 100 foot width was justified by
the evidence which showed more than that had probably been used.
That case also stated, however, that the court must fix a width
according to what was reasonable and necessary, under all the
facts and circumstances, "for the uses which were made of the
road." The court in Jeremy went on to say the court could not
turn a bridle path abandoned to the public into a boulevard.

"On

the other hand, the implied dedication of a roadway to automobile
traffic is the dedication of a roadway of sufficient width for
safe and convenient use thereof by such traffic."
54. These cases do not clearly answer the question for the
court for a number of reasons.

First, the cases seem to refer,

on one hand, to what "was" the use. On the other hand,
especially in Jeremy,

the courts discuss what "is" necessary now

that the road is declared public for the safety of those "now"
using the road. The Court has pointed out, in Butler
id,

v

Pinecrest,

that it was not error for the court to fail to determine

width when that was not the focus of the litigation.

Secondly,

none of the cases refer to any statutes which state public
policy.
55. In this case the court in it? own defense must comment
on how this issue was raised.

During the trial there was

precious little by way of evidence presented concerning the width
of any portion of this road.

The only direct evidence was from
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Grant MacFarlane, who testified that at the lower, or northernmost portions of the Bench Road, that the road was perhaps an
average of 20 feet wide there-

There was evidence from Haynes

that the road was in places only 8 feet wide and vegetation had
to be cut in the Spring as it had grown over the space of the
road when Haynes was a young man. The testimony did not reveal
any specific places where that occurred or how wide the road was
at any particular place nor how wide on average the road was.
Jacob, to the court1, s recollection, did not present any evidence
directly as to the road width at any point along the entire loop.
There was some evidence that the road across the Boyer Reservoir
was 12 feet. The court, as noted, traveled the entire loop in
October 2007 with counsel. The court was unaware the issue of
width may arise specifically, and in fact it was hardly mentioned
during trial except in closing argument and in one post-trial
brief. It was not mentioned in pre-trial briefs. It was first
mentioned in the trial in Jacob's closing argument, then Haynes
responded and Haynes responded in its post-trial brief. During
the field trip the court did not pay particular attention to. the
width of the road.
would simply iind

However, from that field trip alone the court

and conclude that the width of the road seemed

to vary greatly from the court's observations from oae point to
the next.
seemed

It indeed seemed as narrow as 8 feet in places and it

wider than 20 feet in others. At the very base in the
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northern most portions of the Bench Road testimony showed the oil
and gas companies expanded the road in the 1980s but the exact
beginning and ending of that widening was not revealed. Thus,
respectfully, the court is operating under somewhat of a
disadvantage.

No party referred to any statutes whatever.

55. Most recently, in fact on March 18, 2008, the Utah
Supreme Court decided Pearson

v.

Pearson,

2008 UT 24.

In her

dissenting opinion Chief Justice Durham noted that the courts are
to examine statutory public policy before turning to common law.
In this instance a statute and the case law seem to conflict to
this court's thinking, though again no party briefed the specific
issues.
56. UCA 72-5-108 seems to provide a stated legislative
police that the "width" of rights of way for public highways
shall be set as the highway authority of the State or county may
determine for highways under their respective jurisdiction. This
has been declared by Summit County in 1978 a Class D county road
and it has now been declared, as described herein, a public road
by this court.

It would thus seem under that statute that the

county, Summit County, determines the width.

The "scope" of the

right of way is that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure
safe travel according to the facts and circumstances. UCA 72-5104.

Thus, to this court these statutes indicate, despite the

cases to the contrary, that the court need not declare a width as
-79-

the court defers to the county authority to determine width. The
cases that upheld the trial court's determination of width did
not refer to UCA 72-5-108 or its predecessors, UCA 27-12-93,
which have seemingly been in effect since 1963. The court, based
on that statute, believes that the determination of width is NOT
for the court but for county authorities. The

determination of

the width appears to be the responsibility of the county if this
remains a Class D road.
57. From these thoughts and recitation of the law the court
is of the belief that it ought not to declare a width. However,
if the court's reading of the above statute is wrong, the court
offers these thoughts and conclusions so that the parties need
not return to court in the event the county either vacates this
road or does not believe it is the responsibility of the county
to declare the width of such a road or highway.
58. The court believes that it is attempting to solve a
problem, not merely "find" the law though that is its principle
task.

The evidence showed that Jacob had a crane, cement trucks,

front end loaders, caterpillars, road graders, pipe hauling
trucks, 10 wheel dump trucks, media broadcast trucks, and other
large vehicles on the Bench and Middle Fork Roads. Those
vehicles seemed to have made it to what the court has concluded
is the end of the public road without altering the road in its
public portions. Evidently all construction equipment went along
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the Bench and Middle Fork roads and not on the East Fork Road.
The historic use by wagon and foot and horse indeed would require
much less width in a road normally.

The court has not in any way

focused on the "trailing right" easements contained in X7 and X8
for example, whereby a 100 foot easement along the road was given
for trailing and moving sheep.

The court believes the language

of the cases does not restrict the court to the historic uses
only, but the court may and does consider what will now be safe
for the public who may use that road if in fact it is the court's
responsibility to declare a width.

Again, the cases seem to say

it is the court's responsibility but to this court the statute
seems to say otherwise.

If the court is responsible to declare a

width the court believes the evidence and law allow the court to
declare the road should be 18 feet in width.

That is a far cry

from that requested by Jacob but given that they have built 3
cabins and at least part of a fourth cabin at the southern end of
this now-public road, and given that there may well be greater
vehicle traffic now that the public may visit the area, and given
the safety concerns involved in vehicles passing each other, it
seems to the court a modest change will be required but this will
still allow what the court concludes is reasonable and necessary
and convenient for what uses are likely to be made of this public
road. This will allow two vehicles to pass each other.
59. Again, the court's view is that the common law of Utah
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allows the court to declare a width, but the statutory law
reflecting public policy requires the county to declare the
width.

The court defers to the county but if the court is wrong,

rather than return to court, the above conclusions are the
court's view on the matter.
60. Haynes' contention that this "road widening" could
amount to a taking is rejected. Again, this public road was
actually created long before Haynes purchased the property and
Haynes took the property subject to the public's right of usage.
The court is now merely determining, if it must, what that usage
is as far as being reasonably necessary and convenient to the
public today. A width such that two vehicles can pass each other
is deemed by the court to be reasonable and proper.
61. As to the width of the East Fork Road, the court
believes no evidence justifies any conclusion other than that the
width should remain just as it is presently on the non-public
portion. The public portion is subject to the above comments.
That historical use on the private road amounted to less use than
the public portion, it is used less in the modern time, and is a
private road with limited prescriptive use by only the Jacob and
the $Fater User entities.

Boyer can, of course, fully

access

their property via the public road and so there is no need nor
justification for any other determination as to the East Fork
Road east of the middle of Section 8. That is also true of the
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Boyer Road.
62. The court does not believe the litigation initiated by
Haynes was in bad faith. It is a most difficult case for the
court and the court sees no bad faith on behalf of any party
though the court does wonder why the concessions given by Haynes
were not announced 10 years ago. It appears true Haynes has not
really attempted to stop the Jacob entities from use of the loop
road, but Haynes for some reason believes Boyer has no access.
Haynes is wrong, but not in bad faith for so believing.
63. Similarly, the court concludes there are no damages for
any trespass Haynes has caused by interfering with right of
access.

No evidence was presented on any such damages in any

event.
Defendant is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP,
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. THIS MEMORANDUM DECISION IS
INCORPORATED INTO ANY PREPARED ORDER AND THIS DECISION IS
CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE COURT'S FINAL ORDER.
DATED this ^/j

day of j'^Q^Cf

, 2008,

BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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APPENDIX B
Ruling and Order, August 29,2008, R-Haynes 1678-1692

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC,
et al.,
Defendant.
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC,
et al.,
Counterclaim
Plaintiffs,

RULING and ORDER
Case No. 980600244
[Consolidating Case Nos.
00600299 and 980600244]
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
DATE: August 29, 2008

vs.
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY, et al.,
Counterclaim
Defendants.
TRIPLE H. RANCH, LC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FERN J. BOYER et al.,
Defendants and
Third PartyPlaintiffs,
vs.
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY, et al.,
Third-Party
Defendants.
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The above matter came before the court on August 26, 2008
for oral argument on various motions and requests.

Haynes was present through Ray G. Martineau and Leslie W.
Slaugh; Jacob was present through Clark Waddoups, Jonathan 0.
Hafen, and Tobi D. Potestio; Boyer was present through Brent A.
Bohman; Summit County was present through Jami R. Brackin, and
the State of Utah was present through Steven G. Schwendiman.

Discussion was held on the following: Jacob Family Chalk
Creek, LLC, Catherine B. Christensen, LLC, and Brian Garff's
(Jacob) Motion for Entry of Proposed Form of the Order and in the
alternative to Reopen Evidence for Limited Purpose; Haynes Land &
Livestock Company, Triple H. Ranch, LC, and Chalk CreekHoytsville Water Users Cbrporation's (Haynes) Motion for
Reconsideration of Road Width; and Fern Boyer, Gerald G. Boyer,
Gregory J. Boyer, and J»S. Hansen's (Boyer) Motion for
Reconsideration, or in the Alternative, for Clarification,
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Jacob filed their motion on May 15, 2008.
opposition memorandum on May 21, 2008.
memorandum on June 9, 2008.

Jacob on June 17, 2008.

Jacob filed a reply

Haynes filed their motion for

reconsideration on May 21, 2008.
memorandum on June 9, 2008.

Haynes filed an

Jacob filed an opposition

A request to submit was filed by

Based thereon oral argument was

scheduled. That was postponed as Boyer filed their motion for
reconsideration on July 30, 2008.

Haynes filed a memorandum in

opposition and Boyer filed a reply and request to submit for
decision the same day. The court scheduled argument on all
motions for August 26, 2008.

Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties.

Since

taking the issues under advisement, the court has further
considered the law and facts relating to the issues. The court
has further reviewed the trial proceeding? and relevant exhibits.
Now being fully advised, the court renders the following Ruling
and 'Order.
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BACKGROUND
The background for this case was set forth in the Court's
prior memorandum decision of March 21, 2008.

ARGUMENTS
Jacob moves for entry of their proposed form of order and
final judgment and alternatively to reopen evidence for the
limited purpose of addressing the issue of the road's width- A
newer version of a proposed order was provided at argument.
Jacob's proposed order differs from the decision of the court in
some respects.

First, they request the order be modified to show

they do not have a prescriptive easement on the East Forfc road.
Second, they requested but withdrew at oral argument that the
order be modified to state the road is 36 feet wide for "safety
and maintenance" purposes instead of the court's 18 foot
determination.
Jacob, after reviewing the tape of the trial record,
suggests that Haynes only stipulated that Jacob had a
prescriptive easement across the Bench road.
Jacob agrees that Summit County should determine the width
of the road.
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Haynes argues in their opposition memorandum that the road
should not be expanded beyond the 18 foot declaration and that
the court should not reopen evidence on the issue of road width.
Haynes claims that testimony set the traveled surface of the road
at only eight feet.
width.

Eighteen feet would be more than twice that

Haynes says the court found the existing road sufficient

for travel by large trucks and equipment.

Further, Haynes denies

that the Summit County Development Code, upon which Jacob relies,
is controlling and that the recommendation contained therein
pertains to subdivisions only.

Haynes argues that the "Rights-

of-way Across Federal Lands Act" upon which Jacob relies is not
applicable because it was not enacted until after this lawsuit
commenced.
Haynes cites Western
No.

1 v.

Jackson

Cattle

Kane County
Co.,

744 P.2d

Special
1376,

Service
1377

(Utah

District
1987)

which upheld the determination that a road should be 10 feet wide
while noting it was of such width during its public use.

Haynes

argues that there is no evidence that the road in its present
condition is not safe.
Haynes contends that to reopen evidence now on the issue of
road width would cause them prejudice, be unfair, and would
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unnecessarily delay proceedings.

In reply Jacob again asserts that Utah Code Ann, § 72-5-108
supports a statutorily prescribed road width to be determined by
Summit County,

Summit County joins that position.

Jacob cites Hunsaker

v.

State,

509 P.2d

352,

354

(Utah

1973)

to show the Utah Supreme Court in determining the width of a road
started with a statutory presumption and then looked to
potentially rebutting evidence,
Bertagnole,

116 P.2d

420,

424

Jacob asserts, quoting Jeremy v.

(Utah 1941),

that any established

use should be continually possible in a safe and convenient
manner.

Haynes objects to certain portions of the proposed order
submitted by Jacob.

Haynes points to Rule 7(f)(3), URCP, to

support its assertion that the order should not include a
reference to incorporating the court's memorandum decision.
Haynes agrees with Jacob that the order should reflect that
Jacob has a right to use the Berich road, but not the East Fork
road.
Haynes contends the boundary between the Haynes and Boyer
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properties is at the boundary of sections 27 and 34, not "in"
section 34 itself.
Haynes objects to making the road 36 feet wide and insists
it should remain at 18 feet as originally determined by the
court. Haynes argues Summit County should not determine the width
of the road but the court must do so.
Haynes assert the Boyer Defendants' easement denial was a
denial of all types of easement, not just prescriptive.
Haynes asserts the order should state that all other claims
of access by Jacob are denied.
Finally, Haynes asserts that the order should say the Jacob
claim for easement is denied instead of not reached.

Jacob objects to the proposed order of Haynes.
Jacob asserts there is a significant difference in denying
its claim and not reaching it and the language of the order
should be the claim was not reached.

This would enable an

appellate court to remand with Jacob retaining access to its
property.

If the claim was denied and the appellate court

reversed the decision that the road is public, Jacob is denied
access to its property.
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Boyer argues that the Court has decided without elaboration
that they do not have a prescriptive right to use the East Fork
road to access their property and that Water Users have a
prescriptive easement across their property. Boyer argues the
court misapprehended their argument as to when the prescriptive
easement was acquired.

Haynes did not even know Boyer had an

interest in the Boyer property until long after the twenty-year
period was over.

Evidence that a key was given to the gate does

not mean the use was permissive.
Boyer recites from the courts memorandum decision that Gary
and Greg Boyer have used the road for more than the 20-year
prescriptive easement period.

They assert their use was not

permissive and there was never any interruption of the use.
Boyer argues the Water Users never asserted a claim for a
prescriptive right of way across the Boyer property and never
presented any evidence to that effect.

Boyer therefore claim

there is no leg^l basis for granting such a right of way.

In opposition Haynes asserts no road existed during the time
Boyer claims prescriptive use.

Haynes maintains that the key
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given by Howard Haynes, Sr. granted permission to use the road
and thus the use could not be adverse.

By locking the gate,

Haynes interrupted the statutory period for a prescriptive
easement.
Haynes also asserts that the Water Users claims were tried
by consent.

Since there was no objection to the evidence on the

matter, it would be a waste of resources to try the issue again
separately.

Boyer in reply again maintains its use of the road was
adverse, that provision of a key to the gate does not rebut the
presumption of adversity, that the Okelberry

case does not apply,

that their use of the road was not under the claim of JacobChristensen, and that Water Users have not presented any evidence
to support a prescriptive easement.

DISCUSSION
The court has fully considered the positions of the parties
and again reviewed the relevant portions of the file and exhibits
and reviewed the necessary parts of the file.
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1. Road width
The court believes its memorandum decision was correct.
Under UCA 72-5-108 the relevant highway authority considers the
factors set forth by statute in that chapter 5 of Title 72.

The

court's comments as to its "feelings" were in essence dicta and
thoughts as the court ruled and reaffirms that the decision as to
the width of a public road belongs to Summit County.

This court

is not "delegating" the decision to a governmental entity as the
legislature has done that. The court believes not only does the
statute make that clear but policy does as well.

Summit County

is certainly able to conduct hearings and consider input and
exercise its expertise in a more meaningful manner than is the
court on such issues as what is reasonable and necessary for
safety of the public.
Haynes arguments as to the "taking" are again rejected.

The

court determined previously and reaffirms that Haynes never had
something to take.

This road was public before Haynes bought the

property and Haynes accepted and took the property subject to
that public rights Further, there has been no taking at this
point in any event.
The court DENIES Haynes motion for reconsideration.

Thus,
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the court will sign an order in the language of paragraph 12 of
the order provided to the court August 26, 2008,

2. Boyer's motion to reconsider or clarify.
The court will not change or modify its final conclusion
about Boyer's not having any type of easement along the East Fork
road.

The court does not believe any further findings are

necessary as the court found any use was permissive.

The only

reasonable explanation for having a locked gate and advising
someone of where a key can be found to open that gate is that the
use was permissive*

Thus, the court will clarify to the extent

needed that the court found and concludes that any use by the
Boyers since ownership by Haynes has been permissive and thus
there can be no prescriptive easement.
The court does not determine that the bright-line principles
of Okelberry

govern in this situation but the court does conclude

the reasoning of that case applies as well to a prescriptive
eaaement situation.

Where a gate is erected, "Whether over a

public road or otherwise, that is a clear interruption of the
allowed use, whether it be a public road or use under a
prescriptive easement.

Haynes intent is clear here since
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ownership and the gate along the East Fork was intended to keep
people out.

Again, use by the Boyers was permissive and thus the

court's conclusion that they have no right of prescriptive
easement use remains the court's ruling.
The court believes its conclusion as to the easement of the
Water Users is also justified by the court's findings as well and
no modification of that ruling or clarification is granted.
Boyer's motion to reconsider is DENIED.

The court has carefully examined the proposed order given
to the court August 26, 2008, and has considered the comments and
arguments of the parties as to that order.

The court directs

Jacob-Christensen to prepare a final order in that same form and
content but adding paragraph 21 from Haynes's proposed order
dealing with the private nature of the Water User's road.
The court will then sign that final order which is again to
incorporate fully the court March 21, 2008, memorandum decision
as well as this bri^f clarification to the cpurt's denial of
Boyer's claim of prescriptive easement over the East Fork Road.

The court believes its memorandum decision of March 21,
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2008, was correct and reaffirms it in all aspects other than as
indicated in the order the court will sign.

DATED t h i s

J day of /fl/<f

f

2008

BY TH
THE .COURT:

AC-'

A-

BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Mail
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APPENDIX C
Order and Final Judgment, September 16,2008, R-Haynes 1693-1700

Clark Waddoups (3975)
Jonathan O. Hafen (6096)
Tobi D. Potestio (9557)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750
Attorneys for Jacob Family Chalk Creek,
LLC; Catherine B. Christensen, L.L.C.;
and Brian Garff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY,
)

ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC,
et al.,
Defendants.

JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC,
et al.,

•
:
:

1

|
:(
>
]

Counterclaim Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 980600244
[Consolidating Case Nos. 00600299
and 980600244]
Judge: Bruce C. Lubeck

>
;

(j01bB3

HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY, et al.,
Counterclaim Defendants.

TRIPLE H. RANCH, LC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FERN J. BOYER et al.,
Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY, et al.
Third-Party Defendants.

The above-captioned matter came on for trial before the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck on
March 4,5,6,7, and 11,2008. The Court took the matter under advisement at the conclusion of the
trial and on March 21,2008 issued a Memorandum Decision in which the Court set forth its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On
August 26, 2008, the Court heard oral argument on various motions and requests pertaining to the
Memorandum Decision. After taking the additional matters under advisement, the Court issued a
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Ruling and Order on August 29, 2008. For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision, the
Ruling and Order, and for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Memorandum Decision of the Court, dated March 21,2008, and the Ruling and

Order of the Court, dated August 29, 2008, are incorporated into this Order and are considered as
part of the Court's Final Order.
2.

Jacob Family Chalk Creek, LLC, Catherine B. Christensen, LLC, and Brian Garff s

(collectively, "Jacob-Christensen") declaratory action seeking judgment that the road at issue in this
dispute (the uRoad") is a public right of way is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
A.

Pursuant to "R.S. 2477," Act of July 26,1866,ch.262,§ 8,14 Stat 251,253,
codified at A3 U.S.C. § 932, repealed by Federal Land Policy Management
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579 § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743, the Road is a public
way as it traverses through every even numbered section specified in
Paragraphs 3 through 5 below.

B.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2007), the Road is a public way as
it traverses through every odd numbered section specified in Paragraphs 3
through 5 below.

C.

The Road is a private way as it traverses through the sections or portions of
sections specified in Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 below.
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3.

From where the Road forks off of State Road 133 approximately eighteen miles east

of Coalville, Summit County, Utah and travels in a southeasterly direction along the East Fork of
Chalk Creek through Sections 35 and 36 of Township 3 North, Range 7 East; Section 1 of
Township 2 North, Range 7 East; and Sections 6, 7, and 18 of Township 2 North, Range 8 East the
Road is a public way ("Bench Road").
4.

From where the Bench Road ends and the Road travels through Sections 19, 20,29,

32, and 33 of Township 2 North, Range 8 East; and Section 4 of Township 1 North, Range 8 East
the Road is a public way until the eastern most point where the Road crosses back from Township 1
North, Range 8 East, Section 4 into Township 2, Range 8 East, Section 33.
5.

From where the Road forks off of the Bench Road in Section 7 of Township 2 North,

Range 8 East and travels in an easterly direction through Sections 7 and 8 of Township 2 North,
Range 8 East, the Road is a public way through the west half of Section 8 in the township until it
reaches the center line.
6.

The portion of the Road beginning at the center line of Section 8, Township 2 North,

Range 8 East and traveling through the east half of Section 8 and Sections 9,15,16,22,23,26, and
27 (to the boundary between Sections 27 and 34) of Township 2 North, Range 8 East is not a public
road.
7.

The portion of the Road described in Paragraphs 5 and 6 above is collectively referred

to as the "East Fork Road." The East Fork Road ends in Section 34, Township 2 North, Range 8
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East where the property of Fern Boyer, Gerald Boyer, Gregory Boyer, Alfred Blonquist as Trustee
(collectively "Boyer Defendants"), and Triple H Ranch LC begins at its north boundary line.
8.

The portion of Road that traverses the property of the Boyer Defendants and Triple H

Ranch LC in Section 34 of Township 2 North, Range 8 East is a private way and shall be referred
to herein as the "Boyer Road."
9.

The portion of the Road beginning at the eastern most point where it crosses between

Township 1 North, Range 8 East, Section 4 and Township 2 North, Range 8 East, Section 33 until
it reaches the Boyer Road is a private way.
10.

The portion of the Road described in Paragraphs 4 and 9 above is collectively referred

to as the "Middle Fork Road."
11.

The course of the Road stated in Paragraphs 3 through 10 above is depicted on the

map introduced as trial Exhibit 117, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein
by this reference.
12.

The width of the portions of the Road that have been declared a public way shall be

determined by Summit County, Utah according to that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure
safe travel based on the facts and circumstances.
13.

The Chalk-Creek Hoytsville Water Users Corporation have a prescriptive easement

for ingress and egress over the Boyer Road only for purposes of operating and maintaining Joyce
Lake and Boyer Lake reservoirs.
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14.

The Boyer Defendants' claim for an easement over the East Fork Road is DENIED.

15.

Haynes Land & Livestock Company's ("Haynes") claim that a taking has occurred

is DENIED.

16.

Haynes' claims to quiet title in the Road as against the Jacob-Christensens

individually and collectively are DENIED for the portions of the Bench, East Fork, and Middle Fork
Roads that are public as described above.
17.

Haynes' claims to quiet title in the Road as against the Jacob-Christensens

individually and collectively are GRANTED for the portion of the East Fork Road that is not a public
way, as described above, based on a stipulation between Haynes and Jacob-Christensen after the
Memorandum Decision issued whereby the parties agreed Jacob-Christensen does not have a
prescriptive easement across the private portion of the East Fork Road.
18.

Jacob-Christensen's claim for damages due to trespass by Haynes is DENIED.

19.

Jacob-Christensen's claim for easement by grant, easement by necessity, and

prescriptive easement on the Bench Road are not reached based on the Court's ruling that the Bench
Road is a public way.
20.

Default judgment is hereby entered against B.A. Bingham & Sons, LLC, a limited

liability company; David B. Williams, an individual; Stillman Seven, a partnership; Karel J. Snyder,
an individual, Helen W. Blonquist, an individual, Barbara Hall, an individual, and Kevin Hall, an
individual.
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21.

That portion of the road over the property of Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users

Corporation in Section 34, Township 2 North, Range 8 East is a private road and no party has
established any easement or other right of access for the use of that road.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, there being no just reason for delay, pursuant to
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this judgment is entered as a final judgment and
immediate execution may be had and issued on this final judgment.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT ENTERED this /_S_ d a y o f September, 2008.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Bruce C. Lubedk,,
Utah District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
day of September, 2008,1 caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT to be served via first class, U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid upon the following:
Ray G. Martineau, Esq.
Anthony R. Martineau, Esq.
Brett D. Cragun, Esq.

David L. Thomas, Esq.
Jami R. Brackin, Esq.

MARTINEAU LAW

60 North Main
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, UT 84017

SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq.

Timothy W. Blackburn, Esq.

HOWARD LEWIS & PETERSEN

VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

120 East 300 North
Provo, UT 84606

2404 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,UT 84401

Stephen G. Schwendiman, Esq.
Norman K. Johnson, Esq.
Julie L Valdes, Esq.

Paul R. Poulsen, Esq.

ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL

1594 West North Temple, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84116

TESCH LAW OFFICES, PC

314 Main Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 3390
Park City, UT 84060

Brent A. Bohman, Esq.
157 North Commercial Street, Suite 3
P.O. Box 120
Morgan, UT 84050
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